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Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers  
KENT BARNETT 
The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with 
separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid 
appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the 
President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of 
scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to 
defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private 
judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle 
in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes. 
This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural 
causes of action, arguing that institutional, constitutional, and doctrinal limitations 
preclude the branches from serving as structural protectors. Indeed, this Article 
concludes, contrary to recent scholarship, that private claims fit easily within 
established justiciability doctrines. To address legitimate concerns over utility and 
judicial intermeddling, this Article argues that courts should confront the underlying 
doctrine directly by adopting, where appropriate, a functional separation-of-powers 
doctrine with meaningful remedies. Doing so will limit successful claims to only the 
most important and thereby properly balance the political branches’ discretion under 
the Constitution to design the administrative state with useful judicial oversight. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Election Commission issues advisory opinions that affect political 
candidates’ campaigns.1 But all of the Commissioners’ appointments violate the 
Appointments Clause.2 An appellate military court affirms a court-martialed 
defendant’s conviction.3 Yet the judges’ appointments violate the Constitution.4 An 
accounting firm incurs the time and costs of an investigation under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act.5 The enforcing agency, however, is not sufficiently subject to the 
President’s control as the Constitution requires.6 An Article I court rules against a 
party on a state-law claim, and that ruling, if effective, precludes a later-in-time 
state-court judgment in that party’s favor.7 That Article I court usurps federal courts’ 
Article III authority in deciding the state-law claim.8  
In all of these examples, regulated parties—those whom the agencies or Article I 
courts had authority to require to act (or not to act) or to penalize with jail time or a 
fine—asserted what I refer to as “structural challenges.” These challenges are based 
on constitutional separation-of-powers safeguards and thereby implicate how the 
federal government must be structured to pursue substantive policy.9 The judicial 
decisions that established these structural defects prevented the relevant provisions 
from being merely hortatory10 and furthered their goal of protecting individual liberty 
by limiting federal authority.11  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per curiam). The Commission’s 1975 
advisory opinions at issue in Buckley are available at Advisory Opinions, FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao [https://perma.cc/5LD8-2QZ6]. 
 2. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124–43 (holding that all Commissioners’ appointments 
violated the Appointments Clause).  
 3. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995). The tribunal affirmed the 
petitioner’s conviction “except in one minor aspect.” Id.  
 4. The Appointments Clause, as relevant here, and the implementing statute required the 
Secretary of Transportation—a head of department—to appoint the judges, but the 
Department’s General Counsel had improperly done so. See id. at 179–80; see also 49 U.S.C. 
§ 323 (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to appoint officers of the Department); 
U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (permitting “Heads of Departments” to appoint “inferior Officers”). 
The government conceded that the General Counsel’s appointment violated the Appointments 
Clause. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655 (1997) (referring to Brief for the 
United States at 9 n.9, Ryder, 515 U.S. 177 (No. 94-431), 1995 WL 130573). 
 5. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010).  
 6. See id. at 484 (“We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to 
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.”). 
 7. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601–02 (2011). 
 8. See id. at 2608. 
 9. These challenges can also include those based on federalism, as discussed where 
relevant in this Article. But I generally limit my discussion to separation-of-powers challenges 
because of my focus on regulated parties’ challenges and the federal administrative state.  
 10. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 
898–99 (1990). 
 11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
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But these challenges are of debatable utility. In nearly all of these cases, the 
structural defect likely has little, if any, effect on substantive agency decisions. For 
instance, consider the improperly appointed military judges mentioned above. The 
judges simply reaffirmed the challenger’s conviction after they were properly and 
swiftly reappointed.12 As another example, leading scholar Peter Shane has explained 
that the regulated party’s victory in challenging the recess appointments of certain 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) members in NLRB v. Noel Canning13 (the 
Court’s most recent structural decision) will almost certainly not “change the 
outcome of the [regulated party’s] case.”14  
In light of these benefits and drawbacks, should regulated parties have justiciable 
causes of action to set aside agency action based on structural violations?  
Part I.A describes how the Supreme Court has answered affirmatively but 
provided little analysis.15 Sometimes the Court suggests regulated parties have 
interests (or, sometimes, “rights”) and causes of action in structural safeguards. Other 
times, such as in its most recent structural decision (Noel Canning), it is silent.16 The 
Court indicated in Bond v. United States that individuals have prudential standing to 
assert structural challenges,17 but more recently the Court suggested a different 
paradigm that would render its analysis in Bond obsolete.18  
In response to the Court’s cursory engagement with the utility concerning 
structural litigation, scholars have begun to question these challenges altogether. Part 
I.B discusses how the Court’s underlying separation-of-powers doctrine may be to 
blame. Relatedly, Part I.C. considers how scholars have, instead, increasingly 
questioned the justiciability of these actions in three key ways: (1) regulated parties’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. The Secretary of Transportation approbated the General Counsel’s appointments. See 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997). A properly appointed military appellate 
tribunal again rejected Ryder’s arguments that he had presented in his original appellate 
hearing and again affirmed his sentence. See United States v. Ryder, No. 947, at 2–3 (C.G. Ct. 
Crim. App. Apr. 23, 1997) (per curiam). 
 13. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 14. Peter M. Shane, NLRB v. Noel Canning: Two Cheers for Recess Appointments, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m
-shane/nlrb-v-noel-canning-two-recess-appointments_b_5534824.html [https://perma.cc/BM2N
-6RK2]. Indeed, the NLRB recently ratified administrative, personnel, and procurement 
decisions during the time at issue in Noel Canning to avoid additional legal challenges. See 
Tony Mauro, NLRB Ratifies Actions Affected by Noel Canning Ruling, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 5, 
2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/home/id=1202665845879
/NLRB-Ratifies-Actions-Affected-by-Noel-Canning-Ruling?mcode=1202617518855&curindex
=3&back=GA&slreturn=20160004151247 [https://perma.cc/ZZZ9-FZ3S]. 
 15. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 
(2010). The entire discussion concerning implied causes of action occurs in three sentences in 
a footnote.  
 16. See 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 17. 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
 18. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88 
& n.3 (2014) (clarifying that “prudential standing” matters really concern whether a cause of 
action exists and that generalized grievance concerns fall under an Article III standing 
inquiry).  
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Article III and prudential standing, (2) judicial remedies, and (3) the applicability of 
the political-question doctrine.  
First, there are Article III and prudential standing concerns. Article III generally 
requires that challenging parties establish their standing to sue by demonstrating that 
they have an injury in fact, that a causal relationship between the injury and the 
wrongful government action exists, and that a court’s order can redress the harm.19 
But regulated parties’ injury in fact (e.g., having to pay a fine, being subject to an 
investigation, or taking an action that they would otherwise not take) does not seem 
causally related to the underlying wrong because, as noted above, the same harm 
always continues after the court invalidates a separation-of-powers problem.20 
Relatedly, one prominent scholar, Aziz Huq, recently addressed the question of 
private parties’ prudential standing to assert structural challenges (i.e., whether 
prudential considerations should permit them to assert a structural cause of action 
regardless of their Article III standing). He concluded that private parties, as opposed 
to institutional actors, should lack standing (and a cause of action) to assert almost 
all separation-of-powers and federalism challenges because the regulated parties had 
no “rights” in the structural provisions.21 Huq’s main point is that permitting 
structural challenges is inconsistent with the Court’s general standing norms.22 
Second, I have highlighted elsewhere the often erratic and ineffectual remedies 
for successful structural challenges.23 Although the Court occasionally considers 
remedial concerns,24 courts often provide meaningless remedies, with little 
discussion, that may place prevailing regulated parties in a worse position than had 
they not brought their challenges at all.25 I asked (but did not answer) whether, if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 20. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 
1475–80 (2013). 
 21. See id. passim.  
 22. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 20, at 1464. 
 23. See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in 
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 517–36 (2014) (arguing that courts 
often provide meaningless remedies in separation-of-powers litigation that do not satisfy 
relevant remedial values). 
 24. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
507–10 (2010) (discussing whether severance of structural defect was appropriate); Ryder v. 
United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995) (refusing to apply de facto officer or validity 
doctrines); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142–43 (1976) (per curiam) (considering remedies 
and applying a “de facto validity” doctrine to validate prior agency action despite structural 
defect).  
 25. See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 
1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013) (severing structural defect 
provision, although challenging party appears to have sought invalidation of underlying 
ratemaking decision, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 18, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 
684 F.3d 1332 (No. 11-1083), 2011 WL 3918320). Moreover, in internal conference memos 
in Buckley, then-Justice Rehnquist argued, without success, that “it would [not] be wise for 
the Court to make a holding [as to the proper remedy] without the benefit of any argument or 
briefing.” See Conference Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist re: Buckley v. Valeo (Jan. 20, 
1976). All conference memos are available in Justice Powell’s papers, held at the library at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law. See Powell Papers, WASH. & LEE UNIV., 
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courts don’t improve structural remedies, they should preclude private structural 
challenges because, after all, a right requires a meaningful remedy.26  
Third, some scholars have invoked the political-question doctrine, under which 
courts abstain from hearing certain causes of action out of respect to the political 
branches. Huq, for instance, has argued that the President’s ability to remove 
executive officials should present a political question27 and that the legislative and 
executive branches—with limited exceptions—should be able to bargain over 
separation-of-powers boundaries.28 Another influential scholar, Jesse Choper, has 
gone much further, calling for the nonjusticiability of most structural challenges.29 
Other scholars have advanced similar positions as to specific structural protections.30 
These scholars, therefore, would generally leave structural protections to the political 
branches for enforcement and preclude judicial review in all or certain structural 
challenges.  
Finally, scholars have criticized the Court’s underlying formalist 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence (as opposed to structural claims’ justiciability). 
This formalism erects strict boundaries as a prophylactic device, but it ignores 
historical ambiguities,31 realpolitik,32 its decisions’ effects,33 and other values in 
fashioning an administrative state.34 By tirelessly repairing fences among the 
branches’ boundaries without regard to the significance of the intrusion, formalism 
encourages parties to assert insignificant challenges and courts to grant limited 
remedies. 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=236 [https://perma.cc/M8EK-MDQ9]. 
 26. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 500, 544–46. 
 27. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2013).  
 28. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 
(2014). 
 29. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 363 (1980). 
 30. See, e.g., William Marks, Note, Bond, Buckley, and the Boundaries of Separation of 
Powers Standing, 67 VAND. L. REV. 505 (2014); Peter Shane, The Supreme Court Should 
Avoid a Constitutional Ruling in Noel Canning, REGBLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.regblog.org/2013/09/24/24-shane-noel-canning/ [https://perma.cc/SB6T-N7QZ]. 
 31. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944–45 (2011).  
 32. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) (“[T]he branches purportedly are locked in a perpetual 
struggle to aggrandize their own power and encroach upon their rivals. The kinds of partisan 
political competition that structure real-world democracy and dominate political discourse, 
however, are almost entirely missing from this picture.”).  
 33. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 27, at 52 (“[T]he presidential control/democratic 
accountability nexus is causally weaker than the Court’s narrative suggests. Amplifying 
presidential control consequently does not create a predictable quantum of greater democratic 
control of administrative policymaking.”) (emphasis in original).  
 34. See id. at 8 (noting that the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund “view[ed] 
democratic accountability as a singularly important constitutional ideal,” despite scholars’ 
consideration of other goals). 
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This Article responds to these debates in three key ways. First, it concludes that 
the political branches cannot serve as structural defenders, rendering regulated 
parties’ challenges necessary for vindicating structural norms. Second, it concludes 
that these private challenges fit easily within existing Article III and prudential 
standing doctrines. Finally, it concludes that the better method of addressing 
concerns over judicial review’s utility is to create a more functional underlying 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence with stronger remedies.  
First. Part II concludes that faith in the political branches as structural guardians 
is misplaced. First, the political branches lack institutional incentive to serve as 
structural stalwarts. The branches are driven by partisan and policy-based concerns, 
and they will generally defend structural prerogatives only when a branch’s 
constitutional powers align with the interests of the political party that controls it. 
Second, the Constitution and the Court’s current doctrine provide significant and 
defensible impediments to aggrandizing the branches’ litigation power, a solution for 
which certain scholars advocate.  
The political branches’ disadvantages highlight the stakes in deciding whether 
regulated entities have justiciable structural claims. The branches’ limited incentive 
and questionable authority may lead to the underenforcement or nonenforcement of 
structural protections. Regulated parties, even if by default, are the better champions 
of structural rights. Courts should favor interpreting current doctrine to accommodate 
their structural challenges, especially if the doctrine can easily do so. In other words, 
courts should presume that judicial review is proper. 
Second. With this presumption in mind, Part III concludes that, contrary to Huq’s 
view, structural challenges are not aberrations of standing doctrine. Instead, these 
challenges rest comfortably with existing standing and cause-of-action doctrine. To 
be sure, Article III standing often requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 
But the causation and redressability requirements are either inapplicable or 
significantly relaxed for run-of-the-mill, ubiquitous procedural challenges, and 
structural challenges should be treated similarly. Neither procedural nor structural 
rights exist to preordain substantive outcomes; they exist to further other values, such 
as those related to better decision making or the distribution of governmental power 
to prevent despotism, by regulating how and who within government acts. With 
standing in hand, regulated parties should also have an implied cause of action 
because (1) they fall comfortably within structural safeguards’ “zone of interests” (a 
longstanding inquiry) and (2) neither founding history nor historical practice is to the 
contrary.  
Third. Although regulated parties’ structural challenges should be justiciable, Part 
IV addresses the utility concerns surrounding structural litigation. At bottom, the 
various objections rest on the judiciary’s overly active role in structural litigation and 
its failure to give the political branches sufficient discretion when structuring the 
administrative state. Discretion is appropriate because, as others have noted, the 
Court’s formalism as to several provisions is overly broad, lacks sufficient historical 
pedigree, and denies the political branches the opportunity to balance competing 
values when setting up a functioning bureaucracy. At the same time, judicial review 
of structural design permits invalidation of administrative structures that affect the 
branches’ core powers. Rendering structural challenges nonjusticiable (and thus 
unreviewable) is too strong a medicine to cure the maladies of structural 
jurisprudence. 
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This Article concludes by briefly considering how more functional jurisprudence 
can help and discusses two ways of how courts can turn to functionalism. First, 
departing from their current trajectory, courts can directly adopt, where appropriate, 
a more functional doctrine that grants the political branches discretion. Second, 
instead of the limited remedies that they now employ, courts can provide maximal 
remedies, such as not allowing agencies to act until the political branches enact 
curative legislation and not relying on various doctrines that blunt the force of 
judicial remedies (such as severance and stays of judgment). These meaningful 
remedies, perhaps counterintuitively, will lead courts to narrow the underlying 
rights—a phenomenon that scholars have identified in other areas.35 With fewer 
structural violations, courts can constrict structural rights to their core meaning, leave 
the doctrine more functional, and allow the political branches more, appropriate 
discretion. The political branches can assist the courts and increase their discretion 
by clarifying that they do not seek severance of structural defects. With a more 
functional doctrine, courts can—without abandoning the structural constitution to the 
political branches—provide optimal enforcement and address underlying utility 
concerns. 
I. STRUCTURAL “RIGHTS” AND JUSTICIABILITY 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that regulated parties can assert 
separation-of-powers challenges in multiple contexts. But exactly what relationship 
those parties have with the separation-of-powers safeguards is unclear, and 
justiciability questions linger, despite recent scholarly attention to them. These 
unsettled questions are becoming more pressing as the Court has warmly received 
structural challenges and welcomed a more meaningful judicial role in 
separation-of-powers disputes.  
A. Individual Interests in Structural Protections  
The Constitution has numerous structural provisions that affect administrative 
law. Perhaps the most prominent are the three Vesting Clauses, which vest 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Congress, the President, and the 
Article III federal courts, respectively.36 Disputes over Congress’s legislative powers 
typically concern whether Congress has impermissibly delegated its power to one of 
the other branches of government (usually an agency) and thus violated the 
“nondelegation doctrine.”37 Disputes over the President’s executive powers typically 
arise in the administrative context when Congress has limited the President’s power 
to remove executive officials from office.38 And disputes concerning the Article III 
courts’ powers usually concern agencies’ or Article I courts’ jurisdiction over certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See infra notes 380–384 and accompanying text.  
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (legislative power), art. II, § 1 (executive power), art. III, § 1 
(judicial power). 
 37. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 38. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 
(2010). 
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common-law claims.39 But other key structural provisions, as relevant to this Article, 
directly affect administrative architecture. For instance, the Appointments Clause 
requires the President to appoint and the Senate to confirm principal officers of the 
United States, and it requires inferior officers to be appointed, as Congress thinks 
proper, in the same manner or by “the President alone, . . . the Courts of Law, or . . . 
the Heads of Departments.”40 Likewise, the Bicameralism and Presentment 
requirements in Article I provide a specific procedure for enacting legislation41 and 
otherwise limit the ability of Congress to alter legal rights.42 
Regulated parties have some kind of “rights,” “interests,” or other undefined 
connection to these structural safeguards. But the Supreme Court has been unclear 
about the precise relationship between regulated parties and these safeguards. For 
instance, the Court has said, at times, that regulated parties have “personal rights”43 
and, at other times, “interests” in Article III protections.44 As I have noted elsewhere, 
the Supreme Court “has recognized a key difference between ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ 
(or ‘benefits’) in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and that difference affects the 
availability of judicial remedies.45 But it is not clear whether the Court intends for 
similar distinctions in the separation-of-powers context to have remedial 
consequences.46 Likewise, the Court has held that regulated parties have an implied 
right of action to assert challenges based on the President’s powers and the 
Appointments Clause under Article II.47 The Court has allowed challenges to proceed 
under Article I’s Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, but it did so without 
directly addressing whether the regulated party had rights or interests in those 
requirements.48 
Regulated parties’ interests—however described—derive from the purpose of 
structural provisions. The purpose of the separation of powers (and federalism) is, at 
one level, to divide or limit governmental power.49 This division of power does not, 
according to the Supreme Court, inure merely to the benefit of the relevant branches 
of government (or sovereigns) because the division of power is not an end in itself. 
Instead, it is a means for protecting individual liberty from tyrannical government.50 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
848 (1986). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 42. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the 
D.C. Circuit’s judgment that a two-house legislative veto was also unconstitutional. See 
Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 1216 
(1983).  
 43. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Barnett, supra note 23, at 496. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 
(2010). 
 48. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935–44 (1983). 
 49. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364–65 (2011) (referring to both 
federalism and separation of powers). 
 50. The Court has numerous statements to this effect. See, e.g., New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); 
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Indeed, Choper has written that the provisions’ purpose “cannot be seriously 
disputed.”51 Because protecting individual liberty is the end, individuals are 
“intended beneficiaries” of structural provisions.52 Their status, as the Court recently 
held when permitting a criminal defendant to challenge a federal law based on the 
Tenth Amendment, allows them to object to government action based on 
separation-of-powers principles.53 This is so, despite the separation-of-powers’ 
purpose of protecting the branches of government from the others’ incursion,54 
because “a law ‘beyond the power of Congress,’ for any reason, is ‘no law at all.’”55  
The Supreme Court has furthered individuals’ structural challenges in various 
ways. For instance, the Court has attempted to convey the importance of the 
Appointments Clause, which provides relatively specific appointment procedures for 
federal principal and inferior officers, by rejecting the view that the Clause’s 
requirements are mere “etiquette or protocol.”56 Getting the hint, lower courts have 
permitted Appointments Clause challenges outside of quo warranto proceedings,57 
which usually impose procedural hurdles or require approval by executive officials.58 
Moreover, they have eschewed engaging in harmless-error analysis, rendering a 
remedy more likely.59  
                                                                                                                 
 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”); id. at 299 (“There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are 
united in the same person, or body of magistrates . . . .” (quoting Montesquieu)); F. Andrew 
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 318–19 (2008) 
(“The principal reason for dividing powers among the three branches is to prevent tyranny and 
unwarranted government intrusion on individual rights.”).  
 51. CHOPER, supra note 29, at 264–65. 
 52. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (referring to federalism); see also id. at 2365 (referring to 
the “analogous context” of separation-of-powers challenges). 
 53. Id. at 2365. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2368 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 
341 (1928)). 
 56. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). Likewise, the Supreme Court has said that Article III protections 
serve “primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.” CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 
(1986). 
 57. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 58. Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Because Ms. Taitz is neither 
the Attorney General of the United States nor the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia, she does not have standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging a public 
official’s right to hold office.”); J.H. Crabb, Annotation, Right of Private Person Not Claiming 
Office To Maintain Quo Warranto Proceedings To Test Title to or Existence of Public Office, 
51 A.L.R.2d 1306 § 3 (1957) (summarizing jurisdictional differences in seeking quo 
warranto). 
 59. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that showing 
of harm was not required for structural violation to exist); Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1495 (“The 
[Appointments] [C]lause would be a nullity if it could be assumed that these very officials 
would in fact have been properly appointed and (especially) confirmed by the Senate.”) 
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B. Formalist Methodology 
But the Court has done nothing more solicitous of regulated parties’ structural 
challenges than to rely mostly upon formalist (as opposed to functionalist) 
separation-of-powers doctrine. Because so many others have written at length 
about formalism and functionalism,60 what follows is only a brief comparison of 
the analytical methods. When engaging in separation-of-powers formalism, the 
Court understands the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses as dividing federal 
power cleanly into the three branches. The separation of powers is “violated 
whenever the categorizations of the exercised power and the exercising institution 
do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.”61 In 
contrast to formalism, the Court sometimes engages in functionalism by 
considering whether a particular practice or agency structure infringes the “core 
functions” of the branches.62 Functionalism grants Congress much more discretion 
to construct the administrative state under the Necessary and Proper Clause63 and 
generally recognizes that the branches’ outer boundaries are indefinite and 
porous.64  
John Manning has cogently criticized both methods’ implementation. 
Functionalism, he contends, can improperly “privilege general constitutional 
purpose over specific textual detail.”65 This complaint was noticeable in CFTC v. 
Schor.66 Despite longstanding precedent that Article III’s Vesting Clause 
prohibited the removal of common law, equity, or admiralty claims from Article 
III courts’ jurisdiction,67 the Court upheld an agency’s ability to hear a state-law 
counterclaim for the payment of brokerage fees. This was so, notwithstanding the 
Court’s concession that the state-law counterclaims were “at the ‘core’ of matters 
normally reserved to Article III courts,”68 because agency adjudication of the 
claims did not improperly undermine Article III’s purposes.69 With functionalism, 
in other words, even previously marked boundaries give way to administrative 
efficiency. 
                                                                                                                 
 
(emphasis in original); see also Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184 & n.4 (refusing to engage in 
harmless-error analysis and noting government had not preserved argument). 
 60. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 (2000) (summarizing differences and scholarly debates concerning 
formalism and functionalism). 
 61. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 853, 858 (1990). 
 62. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1988). 
 63. Manning, supra note 31, at 1951. 
 64. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987). 
 65. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1943. 
 66. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 67. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1954 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)). 
 68. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853. 
 69. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1953–54 (discussing Schor and functionalism’s 
“underreading” of the Article III Vesting Clause). 
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Manning’s key criticism of formalism, in turn, is that it reads into the three 
Vesting Clauses a background separation-of-powers norm without recognizing the 
following: the indeterminacy of the constitutional provisions, the failure of the 
Founders to set an agreed-upon separation-of-powers baseline, the import of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the numerous compromises in the Constitution 
that lack any shared theoretical basis.70 Manning identifies Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Morrison v. Olson as one example of this formalist failing.71 In arguing that the 
Congress could not constrain the President’s removal power over executive 
officers, Justice Scalia began by looking at the language of the Article II Vesting 
Clause.72 He noted that it vested the President alone with all of “the executive 
power.”73 But because the clause alone did not answer whether Congress could 
constrain (as opposed to wholly take away) the President’s power over executive 
officials, Justice Scalia had to turn to generalized separation-of-powers 
principles.74  
Despite its shortcomings, formalism has largely triumphed over functionalism. 
The Court has applied formalism to the legislative veto,75 the Appointments 
Clause,76 and the Tenth Amendment, generally without exception.77 Formalism, 
with one notable exception,78 has also come to rule Article II in the President’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See id. at 2022. 
 71. See id. at 1965–69. 
 72. See id. at 1966–67. 
 73. See id. at 1967–68. 
 74. See id. at 1968–69. 
 75. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 431 (2012) (referring to Chadha as “textualist and 
formalist in its methodology”); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative 
Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 212 (1984) (“INS v. Chadha was rigidly formalist in 
effect.” (footnote omitted)). 
 76. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1958 (noting that formalism, when applied to 
bicameralism/presentment and appointments, “simply enforce[s] the apparent 
exclusivity of the detailed procedures specified”); Matthew Hunter, Note, Legislating 
Around the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. REV. 753, 759 (2011) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has “fairly consistently applied a formalist analysis” to Appointments 
Clause cases). 
 77. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 
13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s approach to federalism in the 
1990s has been formalistic, not functional.”); Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191, 1193 (2003) (noting criticisms of the Court’s formalist 
federalism decisions). 
 78. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (considering whether the 
impediment on presidential removal power was “so central to the functioning of the Executive 
Branch” to require that impediment’s invalidation); id. at 690 n.29 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting, formalist position). 
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removal-power decisions.79 Article III Vesting Clause jurisprudence has followed a 
similar trend in favor of formalism.80  
Formalism’s ascendancy encourages structural challenges and judicial 
intervention. The Court has stated that separation of powers serves as “a prophylactic 
device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague 
distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”81 By 
kowtowing to “the era’s perceived necessity” or “an expedient solution to the crisis 
of the day,”82 a functional inquiry would improperly permit extraconstitutional 
government, a fate “far worse” than a failed solution.83 To maintain the prophylaxis, 
the Court tirelessly patrols the outermost boundaries of each estate to prevent any 
minor incursion and repair any dented walls. Functionalism, in contrast, would 
permit judges to rock on the porch with shotgun in hand to protect each branch’s 
intimate living quarters.  
C. Justiciability Concerns 
As the judiciary has encouraged structural challenges, scholars have begun to 
question their justiciability. These questions concern regulated parties’ Article III 
and prudential standing (and related ability to assert a cause of action), prevailing 
parties’ remedies, and the suitability of separation-of-powers questions for judicial 
review. The Court has generally left these questions unanswered and wholly failed 
to discern the multifaceted nature of the justiciability issues.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) 
(rejecting Justice Breyer’s functionalist dissent); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) 
(rejecting Justice White’s dissenting, functionalist position). Numerous commenters have 
recognized the Court’s Free Enterprise Fund opinion as formalist. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, 
Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: 
Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers 
Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1610–11 (2012) (“[T]he majority opinion[] in 
Free Enterprise Fund . . . incorporate[s] and reflect[s] strongly formalist reasoning.”); accord 
Michael P. Allen, The Roberts Court and How To Say What the Law Is, 40 STETSON L. REV. 
671, 683–85 (2011). 
 80. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 
SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185 (“[Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011),] is a marked departure 
from other, more recent Supreme Court decisions that took a far more functional approach to 
deciding when Congress could assign judicial matters to non-Article III judges.”) (referring to 
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 
U.S. 568 (1985)); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 79, at 1610–11 (referring to Stern v. 
Marshall as an example of the Court’s formalism). 
 81. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (concerning legislation to 
reopen final judgments). 
 82. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (concerning federalism). 
 83. Id. at 187–88. 
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1. Tensions with Article III Standing 
The Court has created, despite its questionable pedigree,84 a well-known, tripartite 
test that plaintiffs must satisfy to establish a “case or controversy” under Article III.85 
Plaintiffs must first show that they suffer a concrete and particularized 
injury-in-fact,86 in contrast to a legal wrong or mere invasion of a legal right.87 They 
must show, second, that there is a “fairly traceable,” as opposed to speculative, causal 
connection between the injury-in-fact and the impropriety of which they complain.88 
Finally, they must show that a favorable decision will likely redress their 
injury-in-fact, an inquiry that often overlaps with causation.89  
Regulated parties have little trouble establishing injury in fact because they are 
objects of government action. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court, before 
holding that beneficiaries of an environmental-regulatory scheme had failed to 
establish Article III standing, noted that if a plaintiff is an object of the action or 
inaction at issue, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has 
caused him injury.”90 This is so because the regulated parties must do what they 
would otherwise not do (including paying a fine) or refrain from doing what they 
would do. Because they are objects, as opposed to third-party beneficiaries of agency 
action or statutory schemes, much standing scholarship—considering so-called 
“public actions” and problems with restricting beneficiaries from suing—becomes 
irrelevant.91 Regulated parties don’t present the problem of extenuated (or no) injury 
or generalized grievances. They suffer injury because the government is directly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional 
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 817 (1969) (arguing that injury-in-fact was not required 
under British practice); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s 
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 229–31 (2012) (noting historical “ambiguity” over 
propriety of public actions and finding historical evidence seems to favor public-rights view); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) (noting that “stranger” or “citizen suits” were accepted in 
English and early American legal systems); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and 
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394–1406 (1988) (discussing 
English and early American courts’ acceptance of suits that did not require the plaintiff suffer 
injury-in-fact); see also Hessick, supra note 50, at 277–78 (arguing that injury-in-fact inquiry 
for actions founded on private rights is “ahistorical and unjustified”). But see Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 825–26 (2004) (arguing 
that proceedings were generally limited to injured parties). 
 85. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 86. See id. at 560. 
 87. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970) 
(jettisoning “legal interest test” and adopting injury-in-fact test). 
 88. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 89. See id. at 560–61. 
 90. See id. at 561–62. Cass Sunstein has criticized the distinction between objects and 
beneficiaries of governmental action as a “conceptual anachronism.” See Sunstein, supra note 
84, at 188. Unlike Sunstein, I take no position on the propriety of the distinction or of 
beneficiaries’ standing generally. 
 91. See supra note 84 (referring to scholarship concerning standing and “public” actions); 
see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984). 
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affecting their behavior or purse. And governmental control affects only the select 
class of regulated parties (i.e., securities traders, companies creating pollutants, 
banking corporations, etc.), not the entire U.S. population. Indeed, the Court held 
that the challenging party who faced deportation in Chadha satisfied the Article III 
standing desiderata when bringing his structural challenge because of the effect that 
the agency’s action would have on him.92  
The key standing defects in structural litigation, as Huq has noted, concern 
causation and redressability.93 The Supreme Court’s decision in Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization94 informs both issues. In that case, indigents 
and organizations with indigent members sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
IRS Commissioner for violating the Internal Revenue Code (and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)) because the agencies gave favorable tax treatment through a 
Revenue Ruling to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services, 
as opposed to both emergency and nonemergency services, to indigents.95 The 
plaintiffs argued that the government’s action “encouraged” hospitals to deny 
indigents nonemergency care.96 Nonetheless, the Court found it “purely speculative 
whether the denials of [nonemergency] service . . . fairly can be traced to [the 
government’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made by the 
hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”97 Relatedly, the Court noted that 
awarding the relief sought—requiring hospitals to provide more services to the 
indigent to receive favorable tax treatment—would not create a “substantial 
likelihood” that plaintiffs would receive their desired hospital services.98  
Analogous problems arise in structural litigation. For example, Ryder v. United 
States99 illustrates causation problems. The Court held that the appointment of a 
military appellate panel violated the Appointments Clause because the appointment 
was not made by a head of department (the Secretary of Transportation) but by a 
general counsel.100 Nevertheless, the same officers were later properly appointed, 
and they once again rejected the enlisted man’s appellate arguments.101 The enlisted 
man’s injury-in-fact—his conviction102—did not appear to arise from the structural 
defect because the same harm occurred both before and after the defect existed.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935–36 (1983). 
 93. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1475–80. 
 94. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
 95. Id. at 28. 
 96. Id. at 42. 
 97. Id. at 42–43. 
 98. Id. at 45. 
 99. 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
 100. 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995). 
 101. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 102. His injury-in-fact was not the violation of any right to a properly appointed tribunal. 
Such an injury would be a “legal injury” that the Supreme Court has clarified does not count 
as injury-in-fact and, despite contrary decisions before 1970, is no longer relevant to the 
standing inquiry. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970); cf. Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 200 (noting that violation of a statutory procedural 
right alone under the Freedom of Information Act amounts to legal injury, not injury in fact). 
2016] STANDING FOR (AND UP TO) SEPARATION OF POWERS 679 
 
Redressability can be similarly problematic. For instance, in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) began investigating the plaintiff accounting 
firm.103 The firm argued that the PCAOB had too much independence from the 
President because its members could only be removed for very limited causes by the 
Securities and Exchange Commissioners (SEC), who, in turn, could only be removed 
for limited cause by the President.104 The Supreme Court agreed.105 The firm sought 
an injunction to stop the PCAOB from exercising its powers.106 The Court, instead, 
severed one of the levels of protection from removal (leaving the PCAOB members 
subject to the SEC’s at-will removal), otherwise left the statute and the agency fully 
operative, and permitted the investigation to continue before the PCAOB.107 That 
remedy allowed the investigation—the injury-in-fact—to continue, even if it was 
now pursued by a properly subordinate agency, and the Court did not remedy any 
past harm suffered.108 And, in fact, the investigation continued after the Supreme 
Court’s decision.109 To be sure, some challenges that could lead to the invalidation 
of a federal conviction, such as the one in Bond v. United States,110 are more likely 
to satisfy all three Article III-standing requirements.111 But, as Ryder and Free 
Enterprise Fund indicate, Article III’s desiderata do not always appear satisfied or 
even considered.  
2. Prudential Standing (or Lack of Causes of Action) 
Aside from Article III standing, challenging parties must establish their prudential 
standing or perhaps instead, based on a very recent Supreme Court decision, their causes 
of action. In Bond v. United States, the Court unanimously held that a criminal defendant 
had prudential standing to challenge a federal criminal statute under the Tenth 
Amendment.112 In doing so, the Court—after distinguishing modern notions of standing 
from an earlier decision’s inquiry into implied causes of action113—disapproved of 
earlier suggestions that private parties could not have standing to assert Tenth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 484. 
 106. See id. at 487. 
 107. See id. at 508–10, 513–15. 
 108. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 518–21 (discussing theoretical remedial deficiencies in 
Free Enterprise Fund); Huq, supra note 20, at 1477. 
 109. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 519 n.214 (noting that the PCAOB and the accounting 
firm ultimately settled the dispute). 
 110. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
 111. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1475 (“In Bond, the presence of the three canonical 
elements of constitutional standing . . . were tolerably clear given the underlying proceeding’s 
criminal complexion.”). 
 112. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–2367. 
 113. That decision was Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, and 
the language at issue is found at 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) (“[T]he appellants, absent the states 
or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the [Tenth 
A]mendment.”). 
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Amendment claims.114 The Court relied upon federalism’s aim of securing individual 
liberty and, by analogy, on separation-of-powers jurisprudence in which private 
parties have been the principal challengers.115 
Huq has criticized Bond’s reasoning. In brief, he argued that private parties should 
lack prudential standing (or a cause of action116) to assert structural claims for the 
following reasons: no individual “rights” to structural safeguards exist,117 their 
adjudication has substantial “spillover effects” (such as effects on states’ and federal 
authority) that the standing doctrine generally avoids in other contexts,118 plaintiffs 
have causation and redressability concerns,119 the relationship between liberty and 
structural safeguards is weak, and the challengers will usually be sore losers from the 
political realm.120 He argues that individuals should be able to enforce structural 
safeguards only when the affected institution cannot do so, with exceptions for 
matters that implicate due process concerns “based on assertions of legal authority 
that are manifestly unreasonable”121 or Article III protections.122 Huq’s main point is 
that, notwithstanding Bond, individuals’ structural challenges rest uncomfortably 
with general standing jurisprudence. 
More recently, the Court has indicated that prudential standing should be 
reconceptualized as asking whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action.123 In 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,124 the Court, after 
noting its inconsistent use of the term “prudential standing” and the inquiries that are 
germane to it, stated that whether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests of the 
law invoked is really a question of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.125 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
 115. Id. at 2364–65. 
 116. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321. 
 117. See id. at 1448–52. 
 118. See id. at 1466–75. 
 119. See id. at 1484–90. 
 120. See id. at 1491–1514. 
 121. Id. at 1517 (emphasis in original). 
 122. See id. at 1519–21. 
 123. Scholars had so advocated for decades. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 779; William A. 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 236, 252 (1988). But see Eugene 
Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1684–85 (2007) (arguing that 
standing addresses “whether individuals’ rights overlap in a way that can prevent their efficient 
allocation” (emphasis omitted)). The Court continued merging justiciability doctrines during 
the same term. It noted that “Article III standing and ripeness issues in this case ‘boil down to 
the same question’” in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014), 
and reserved answering whether ripeness factors concerning fitness and hardship had 
“continuing vitality,” id. at 2347. 
 124. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 125. Id. at 1387. Although the zone-of-interests test derived from prudential standing 
concerns under the APA, the Court has applied the test to statutory claims to which the APA 
does not apply, see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), and to 
constitutional provisions, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982). The Court also clarified that so-called 
“statutory standing” is a matter that goes to the merits and thus is not a jurisdictional inquiry 
under Article III. See Richard Re, The Doctrine Formally Known as “Statutory Standing”, 
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Court also clarified that, despite inconsistent treatment, inquiries into generalized 
grievances concern Article III standing.126 The Court in Bond, merely three years 
before, not only never spoke of the zone-of-interests test nor framed its discussion as 
concerning causes of action, but specifically distinguished prudential standing from 
a cause-of-action inquiry.127 Thus, it is unclear whether a prudential-standing or a 
cause-of-action inquiry (or both) applies to structural challenges. 
Although the shift from standing to causes of action may be merely cosmetic in 
some contexts,128 the more thorough inquiry for causes of action is preferable here. 
Standing focuses on a particular plaintiff, asking whether the plaintiff at bar is the 
proper person to assert a cause of action that is available to someone.129 The 
cause-of-action inquiry, in contrast, focuses more broadly on whether the (or any) 
plaintiff has a right whose violation warrants judicial remedy.130 As we shall see, 
speaking in terms of not only rights but also remedies, as causes of actions do, better 
reveals how regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges fits with existing 
doctrine, permits a broader consideration of justiciability arguments, and allows 
judicial flexibility to refashion the breadth of these challenges through substantive 
doctrine and remedies. I pursue this more robust cause-of-action inquiry in Parts II 
and III. 
3. Pyrrhic and Minimal Remedies 
Judicial remedies for structural violations often betray courts’ solicitous attitude 
towards structural challenges. As I have argued elsewhere, courts often fail to 
provide remedies that satisfy key remedial values, such as compensating for past 
harm, providing full prospective enforcement of the underlying right, incentivizing 
parties to seek redress, and deterring structural defects.131 These inadequate remedies 
derive from courts’ penchant in structural cases for minimalistic remedies,132 whether 
through severance of offending provisions, remedial-mitigation doctrines, or stays to 
avoid enforcement. 
Courts often use severance to mitigate the remedial effects of structural defects. 
For instance, the Court in Bowsher v. Synar,133 held that Congress could not remove 
                                                                                                                 
 
RE’S JUDICATA (Aug. 27, 2014, 2:30 PM) https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/08
/27/the-doctrine-formerly-known-as-statutory-standing/ [https://perma.cc/2TUF-YQ58]; see 
also Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4. 
 126. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3. 
 127. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–63 (2011). 
 128. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321 (“To my mind, nothing particularly significant 
seems to rest on the formulation of the issue as one of standing rather than a cause of action.”). 
 129. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975); Mary Siegel, The Implication 
Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1088 n.18 (1979) 
(“A cause of action is distinguishable from standing, because a cause of action denotes that 
some party may sue under the statute, while standing focuses on whether the plaintiff has an 
interest sufficiently adverse to create a ‘case or controversy.’”). 
 130. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 781; Siegel, supra note 129, at 1088 n.18. 
 131. See Barnett, supra note 23. 
 132. See id. at 536. 
 133. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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the Comptroller General, who performed the executive function of deciding which 
spending cuts the President was required to implement, without impeding the 
President’s supervisory powers under Article II.134 The Court relied upon an express 
“fallback” provision in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 that, if the statute were deemed unconstitutional, called for the Comptroller 
General to lose his executive powers and allowed the budget-cutting process to 
continue without him.135 Courts may also infer Congress’s preference for severance. 
Take Free Enterprise Fund, the decision in which the Court invalidated the PCAOB 
members’ two layers of protection from presidential oversight. There, the Court 
inferred that Congress would prefer the severance of one of those layers and permit 
the remainder of the statute to remain “fully operative.”136 The D.C. Circuit more 
recently extended Free Enterprise Fund’s inferred severance remedy in response to 
the unconstitutional appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges137 because it sought 
to create “as little disruption as possible.”138 
Remedial-mitigation doctrines and stays of judgment also play a role. The Court 
has done so mostly with Appointments Clause violations. In severance’s place, the 
Court has turned to the de facto officer and different, though related, de facto validity 
doctrines to mitigate the effect of a structural defect. The de facto officer doctrine, 
although applied several times to prevent administrative chaos, is narrow.139 It 
validates the actions of an officer whose appointment, as determined on collateral 
judicial review, violated statutory law.140 For constitutional challenges brought on 
direct review, the Court has applied, yet later called into question,141 the de facto 
validity doctrine. Without any briefing from the parties,142 the Court in Buckley v. 
Valeo applied the doctrine after finding that all of the Federal Election 
Commissioners’ appointments were unconstitutional.143 The Court held that the 
FEC’s past acts had “de facto validity” and allowed the Commissioners to continue 
functioning fully during a thirty-day stay that the Court granted Congress to 
reconstitute the FEC.144 The Court also stayed its judgment in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. and granted an extension at the Solicitor 
General’s request145 to give Congress time to refashion a bankruptcy system that 
complied with Article III.146 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Id. at 733–34, 736. 
 135. See id. at 718–19, 734–36. 
 136. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 481 (2010) 
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The meaninglessness of these remedies for structural challengers may be most 
apparent in Free Enterprise Fund and Buckley. In Free Enterprise Fund, the 
regulated party prevailed in its Article II-based structural challenge to the agency that 
had begun investigating its activities. The Court’s severance-based remedy failed to 
compensate the prevailing party for past injury, failed to stop the agency from acting, 
returned the prevailing party to an investigation before officers whose very 
legitimacy it had successfully questioned, failed to ensure that any taint from the 
unconstitutional investigation would not impact future events, and failed to see that 
Congress and the President—who created the constitutional violation—had to take 
responsibility for violating Article II by enacting curative legislation. The prevailing 
parties in Buckley received a more insulting remedy. Despite the blatantly 
unconstitutional appointment of all FEC commissioners,147 the prevailing parties 
were not entitled to compensation or other injunctive relief for the agency’s past 
action (any sovereign immunity notwithstanding) because the past actions were de 
facto valid and the agency was allowed to continue functioning fully for another 
thirty days.148  
These inadequate remedies betray the Court’s paeans to structural safeguards. 
Regulated parties’ interests or rights in structural safeguards do not appear as 
important as the Court’s rhetoric proclaims. As the importance of the rights begins 
to fall away, the case for structural litigation becomes less compelling.  
4. Political Questions 
Unlike most other justiciability doctrines, the modern political question doctrine 
allows courts to ignore constitutional questions altogether—no matter who brings 
suit, no matter whether proper remedies are available, and perhaps no matter how 
patently unconstitutional a government action is.149 The doctrine prevents judicial 
review when there exists:  
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. Congress knowingly ignored the arguments that the appointments were blatantly 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 137–38 (1974); Various Measures 
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from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.150 
This humorously vague, multi-headed doctrine is, in Erwin Chemerinsky’s words, 
“the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines,” becoming as unmanageable as 
the standards that it eschews.151  
What is more, the Court has applied it inconsistently to structural matters. It has 
applied the doctrine to, among other things, the Republican “Guaranty Clause,”152 
various constitutional claims arising from elections and redistricting,153 certain 
matters concerning foreign relations,154 congressional proceedings,155 cases 
concerning military training,156 and matters related to impeachment-trial 
procedure.157 But the Court has refused to apply it to cases concerning the exclusion 
of elected members from sitting in the House158 and the Origination Clause.159 And 
the Court has addressed the merits of nondelegation, removal power, standard and 
recess appointments, and Article III challenges—those that are most germane to 
regulated parties and the administrative state—without mentioning the doctrine. 
Jesse Choper has urged the Court to apply the doctrine to these areas, too,160 leaving 
them to “the national political process.”161  
Instead of addressing all structural challenges as Choper did, Huq has recently 
invoked the doctrine for cases concerning only the presidential removal power. He 
argues that the Court has not developed judicially manageable standards for 
resolving these disputes.162 In brief, he challenged the Court’s two premises in Free 
Enterprise Fund: (1) the President’s ability to remove officers gives the President 
control, and (2) presidential control leads to democratic accountability.163 He argued 
that the removal power can work against presidential control because bureaucrats 
may seek to take more modest actions to prevent losing favor with later 
administrations and that removal may be too blunt an instrument for control when 
the President, with informational asymmetries, may not know which matters were 
within officials’ control.164 Removal, too, can have high transaction costs.165 As for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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 165. See id. at 41–42. 
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control leading to political accountability, Huq argued that Congress’s budget-setting 
powers and committee oversight can render it difficult to tell who’s to blame for 
agency action or inaction.166 Moreover, voting is an ineffective method of signaling 
preferences on an “unfettered range of federal administrative actions.”167  
II. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Despite the significant justiciability concerns, structural challenges should be 
justiciable. As a preliminary matter, courts should not apply the political-question 
doctrine. Instead, they should presume that judicial review of individual challenges 
is proper because political branches (based on their partisan and policy-based 
decision making) cannot serve as structural defenders. Relatedly, the branches 
themselves cannot litigate structural defects, as Huq would have them do, without 
encountering doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic obstacles. The branches’ 
weakness as structural protectors in and out of court demonstrates the importance of 
addressing the justiciability of regulated parties’ challenges. 
A presumption of judicial review is sound and important. It provides a 
background norm in assessing whether courts, in the face of ambiguity, should craft 
justiciability doctrine in favor of review. Notwithstanding contrary suggestions, Part 
III argues that regulated parties’ structural challenges rest relatively well with current 
justiciability doctrine. But even if others are prone to conclude otherwise, this 
presumption provides a normative reason for resolving doubts in favor of judicial 
review. For the reasons that follow, judicial review of regulated parties’ structural 
claims is vital because the political branches, contrary to other scholars’ assertions, 
cannot serve as faithful defenders of structural protections.  
A. Political Branches’ Lack of Institutional Incentive 
Jonathan Siegel has made the institutional case for judicial review in the face of 
revived calls for “popular constitutionalism.”168 He concludes that the alternatives to 
judicial review—the electoral and the political/legislative processes—are worse for 
several reasons. As a preliminary matter, using the electoral process is impractical 
because of problems with engaging a majority of voters in relatively unimportant 
issues or even key civil-rights matters that don’t directly affect them or a popular 
group (such as Eighth Amendment rights for prisoners) and because of the costs in 
electoral campaigning.169 Likewise, theoretical differences exist between judicial 
review, on one hand, and electoral and political action, on the other. Judicial review 
is more focused,170 more transparent,171 more appropriate for protecting the rights of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See id. at 53–56. 
 167. Id. at 64; see also Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review, 97 
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minorities,172 and available for individual litigants without collective action.173 
Moreover, judicial review is based on precedent, giving “rights” a more established 
character than when enforced through discretionary legislative or electoral 
processes.174 Because of the courts’ institutional advantage in addressing 
constitutional violations, courts should invoke doctrines that prevent judicial review 
with care.  
But Choper suggests that courts’ institutional advantages are inapplicable to 
structural challenges. The political branches, he argues, have sufficient political tools 
to guard their boundaries “jealously.”175 Focusing on executive incursions into the 
legislative domain, Choper argues that Congress has the ability to resist executive 
aggrandizement through, as most relevant to the discussion here, its appropriation 
power,176 refusal to enact law,177 refusal to confirm appointments,178 and 
impeachment.179 Because of these tools, separation-of-powers challenges, he argues, 
should be “nonjusticiable.”180 Moreover, he argues that the electorate is the “ultimate 
political weapon against consequential separation of powers violations.”181  
Contrary to Choper’s foundational premise, the branches often don’t jealously 
guard their boundaries and thus don’t use the constitutional weapons at their disposal 
when structuring agencies. One needs simply to consider successful structural 
challenges to find supporting evidence. Consider that the President agreed to the 
defects that the courts have identified in the appointments in Buckley and 
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, the removal power in Free Enterprise Fund 
and earlier cases, and the “legislative veto” in Chadha, although these defects limited 
executive power. Likewise, in the two cases in which the Court found a 
nondelegation violation,182 Congress enacted legislation that gave away its 
legislative power. And the courts have generally been exceedingly leery of finding 
Article III violations at all in the context of agency adjudication,183 suggesting 
hesitation from even the judicial branch. To be sure, Congress and the President have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See id. at 1174–75, 1186–87. 
 173. See id. at 1175–76, 1187–88. 
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 175. CHOPER, supra note 29, at 275. 
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taken adversarial positions in some circumstances, but these have almost always been 
in the context of foreign relations, war powers, or criminal activity within the 
executive branch.184 The administrative state’s architecture has failed to engender the 
same adversarial positioning. 
Instead, partisanship often subsumes the political branches. Daryl Levinson and 
Rick Pildes have demonstrated that James Madison’s institutional-competition 
model185 has given way to government organized not by branch, but by political 
parties.186 The branches do not have “wills” of their own; instead, the branches only 
have their respective members’ (including the President’s187) ideological or political 
goals.188 Divided government should generally lead political parties and the branches 
to have aligned interests as each party seeks to achieve different aims or limit the 
other party’s (and branches’) victories. Likewise, unified government should cause 
interbranch competition to wane.189 Since 1832, the government has more often been 
unified than divided,190 meaning that the competing-branches model of U.S. 
government is more often fictional than real. And even during divided government, 
the President has weakened the executive branch. For instance, the unconstitutional 
appointment in Buckley, the improper grant of removal power to Congress in 
Bowsher, and the improper tiered protections from removal in Free Enterprise Fund 
were all enacted during times of divided government.191 In addition, the electorate’s 
limited concern for structural matters and its practical inability to influence structural 
matters, as Siegel notes, render it unlikely that the electorate will become the valiant 
protector of structural safeguards.192 Because institutional incentives do not 
necessarily align with political ones, it is far from clear that the judicial branch, as 
Choper argues, should abstain from deciding structural challenges. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 282–308. 
 185. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
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observations about the states’ failure to advocate for their own interests under our federalist 
system. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 648 
(2014) (noting that “state officials have numerous reasons—ideology, political needs, fiscal 
concerns, personal gain, and more—to depart from the federal structure”). 
 187. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2322. 
 188. See id. at 2317–18. 
 189. See id. at 2329; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“Senators may have little interests in opposing Presidential encroachment on 
legislative prerogatives, especially when the encroacher is a President who is the leader of 
their own party.”). 
 190. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2330.  
 191. The Federal Election Commission Act of 1971 was enacted by a Democratic 
legislature and Republican President, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 was enacted 
by a Republican President and Senate with a Democratic House, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 was enacted by a Republican President and House and a Democratic Senate. 
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Despite the limited salience of structural defects, I identify the President’s removal power over 
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Huq’s narrower call to deem removal-power cases nonjusticiable is more 
compelling. Although Choper does not clarify the precise ground for 
nonjusticiability, Huq identifies the Court’s problem as its inability to create 
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for achieving the constitutional 
good of political accountability (via the President’s control over subordinates).193 
Recall that Huq challenged the removal power’s relationship with presidential 
control because of bureaucratic timidity, informal asymmetries, and transaction 
costs.194 Recall, too, that he challenged control’s relationship with political 
accountability because of Congress’s influence over agencies and the limited ability 
of the electorate to signal displeasure with the President’s oversight of the 
administrative state.195 Because of what he viewed as the unsound premises 
underlying the Court’s removal-powers jurisprudence, he called for the political 
question doctrine to apply. Although having some merit, Huq’s arguments are not 
wholly satisfying because the power to remove is likely more robust than he argues 
(at least when the President hasn’t permitted Congress to limit the President’s power 
to remove agency officials), suggesting that the President’s inattention to the removal 
power in initial agency structuring is misplaced.  
First, bureaucratic timidity seems unlikely for many politically salient officers. 
Political appointees (and thus higher-level officers) are unlikely to be timid merely 
to retain their jobs with incoming administrations. This is because they are unlikely, 
by tradition, to remain at their positions when another party takes over.196 Former 
Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’s service under the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, for example, was noteworthy because of its rarity.197 Indeed, the 
officers seem likely to go along with current presidential preferences to curry favor 
for better positions within the administration, to show loyalty that could appeal to 
later administrations of the same party,198 or to obtain presidential protection from 
congressional reprisal.199 Lower-level officials may have more incentive to act 
timidly because they seek to be career bureaucrats. Yet, even for them, many are 
subject to removal for insubordination by failing to fulfill higher-up officials’ policy 
preferences.200 Thus, removal (whether at will or for cause) can allow the President 
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to control them, too. This is not to say that bureaucratic timidity doesn’t exist, but it 
is a dull sword for severing the connection between removal and control.  
Second, Presidents can remedy their lack of information concerning executive 
officers’ control over regulatory results. They can seek to educate themselves about 
how the decision-making process works, the legal regime in which the 
decision-making occurred, and the external constraints influencing the officer’s 
action. Doing so should not become too onerous considering the rarity of threatened 
removals.201 Indeed, the removal power itself is one of many tools that the President 
(and senior officers) can use to obtain information relevant to supervisory decisions. 
Thus, the removal power can have a role to play in informational gathering and in 
controlling bureaucrats’ actions.202 
Third, the significant transaction costs in and rarity of removing an official do not 
prevent removal—“a doomsday machine”203—from being effective.204 As Brigham 
Daniels has argued in the context of agencies’ use and threat of “regulatory nukes” 
(such as revoking a broadcasting license or an entity’s tax-exempt status) under a 
game-theory model, nuclear powers provide leverage less through their use than 
through their existence and threatened use.205 They allow policymakers, in other 
words, to get their way without incurring the political costs of detonating the nuke. 
This same phenomenon appears to exist with the removal power. Presidents rarely 
have to remove officials; the mere threat of removal encourages resignations.206 
Fourth, the removal of senior officials, unlike almost all other structural matters, 
may be sufficiently salient to affect political accountability. As discussed above, one 
should be generally skeptical of achieving political accountability through electoral 
or lobbying efforts when low-salience matters or minority rights are at issue. But the 
removal or resignation of salient officials, including Cabinet Secretaries, can 
influence public attitudes of the President as the CEO-in-chief by mitigating his 
association with bureaucratic incompetence or wrongdoing. The removal power 
provides a tool for obtaining resignations and thereby allows the President to be 
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“doing something” about governmental problems.207 Recent examples abound.208 To 
be sure, retaining or removing any one official is unlikely to affect many voters. But 
the removal power allows the President to shape the composition of the executive 
branch and help control the narrative that surrounds the President’s administration 
and his or her political party’s performance. The historical practice of encouraged 
resignations (likely obtained under the Damocles Sword of removal) suggests, at the 
very least, that presidents view removal as influencing political accountability.  
All of this is not to say that the Court has correctly understood the importance of 
the removal power; correctly concentrated on this one executive power to the 
exclusion of other powers, values, and political dynamics in drawing Article II 
boundaries; or correctly decided Free Enterprise Fund. Nor is all of this to 
undermine Huq’s useful insight into the limitations on the Court’s Article II 
jurisprudence. My claim is modest. The removal power has some relationship to both 
control and accountability even if it is weaker than the Court or certain scholars 
suggest, and it suggests that the President should care about limitations on the 
removal power when structuring agencies. Moreover, even if Free Enterprise Fund’s 
reasoning is not satisfying (especially in the context of tiered protection from 
removal209), it does not follow that the removal power is always insignificant, that 
manageable standards for removal-power controversies do not exist, or—perhaps 
most importantly here—that judicial review is undesirable in all cases.  
B. Concerns with Branches as Litigating Parties 
Aside from lacking institutional incentives, the branches (or the members that 
comprise them) cannot assert structural challenges—as Huq advocates in almost all 
structural cases—without doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic concerns.210 The 
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Court has been consistently hesitant about allowing the branches and their individual 
members to serve as parties in litigation. The Court has worried that permitting such 
actions would lead courts to resolve purely political disputes. Moreover, the lack of 
institutional incentives for the political branches to guard their boundaries in the first 
instance also suggests that they would lack incentives to litigate. Branch-standing 
proponents overlook these doctrinal and institutional limitations,211 rendering their 
proposed solution more complicated than it first appears. 
As noted earlier, most structural defects arise through legislation that satisfied 
bicameralism and presentment, meaning that both houses of Congress and the 
President agreed to the structure at issue.212 Accordingly, likely challengers would 
be the individual members of the affected branch who failed to convince their 
colleagues otherwise. But they lack standing. In Raines v. Byrd,213 the Court held 
that individual senators and House members lacked standing to have the federal 
courts declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional.214 In so doing, the Court 
noted that awaiting lawsuits from private individuals, as opposed to politicians, keeps 
the courts out of political disputes.215 Quoting Justice Powell’s concurring opinion 
in United States v. Richardson, the Court argued that courts serve to protect 
individual citizens’ constitutional rights and liberties, not to provide amorphous 
supervision for government action.216 To support its position, the Court noted the 
historical practice by which legislative members, executive officials, and Presidents 
have not challenged legislation based on structural defects—including the limitations 
on the President’s removal power in the Tenure of Office Act, the limitations on the 
Attorney General’s authority based on the “legislative veto” at issue in Chadha, the 
FEC appointments in Buckley v. Valeo, and the President’s pocket veto.217  
Moreover, allowing the branches themselves, as opposed to the individuals within 
the branch, to assert structural challenges presents its own problems. First, the Raines 
Court seems schizophrenic on the propriety of institutional standing. It relies upon 
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the failure of the President (the head of the executive branch) and the Attorney 
General (the head of a department) to assert structural challenges in the past when 
arguing that the individual legislators lacked standing and suggests that such standing 
is improper under the “regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date.”218 
But, then cryptically, it “attach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the individual 
legislators] ha[d] not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of 
Congress in [the] action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose[d] their suit.”219 
How much importance attached is unclear, especially because the Court closed its 
opinion by saying that “[w]hether the case would be different if any of these 
circumstances were different [including if the Houses approved of the litigation], we 
need not now decide.”220 At the very least, institutional standing after Raines was of 
questionable propriety.221 
The Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission222 further undermines branch standing. To be sure, the 
Court held that the Arizona legislature, as authorized by both legislative houses, had 
standing to challenge under the Elections Clause an independent redistricting 
commission’s power to set legislative districts.223 But, citing Raines, the Court 
carefully distinguished a state legislature’s standing from congressional standing: 
“The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has 
standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal analogue to 
Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would 
raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”224  
But even if the federal political branches have standing, the Court’s jurisprudence 
suggests that the branches can serve, at most, as proper parties only when they are 
defending, as opposed to challenging, structural norms that the branches themselves 
enacted. When Congress has served as a party in litigation, the Court has blessed its 
service in defending legislation from a structural attack. This was the case in Chadha, 
where the executive branch sided with the private party who argued that the 
legislative veto violated bicameralism and presentment, and both Houses of 
Congress intervened as parties in the litigation to defend the legislative veto.225 
Likewise, although not resolving whether the House had standing, the Court in 
United States v. Windsor226 relied upon the House of Representatives’ Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG’s) intervention to defend the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) when holding that the executive branch, despite 
its agreement with a challenging private party that DOMA was unconstitutional, had 
prudential standing.227 Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, found that 
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the BLAG had standing “to defend the undefended statute.”228 These opinions all 
suggest that legislative standing extends to the defense of enacted legislation but say 
nothing about standing to assert initial challenges.  
Although space constraints prevent full discussion of institutional standing’s 
normative contours, doctrinal limitations make sense in light of circumscribed, 
enumerated powers under Articles I and II. As Tara Leigh Grove has recently 
argued, the President obtains standing in federal court based on his or her power 
under Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”229 This power 
allows him or her to defend federal law and to refuse to enforce unconstitutional 
laws.230 But it doesn’t give the President standing, Grove argues, to challenge a 
federal statute merely to protect his or her own institutional or political interests.231 
The President does not need judicial standing to prevent the enforcement of an 
unconstitutional act; instead, he or she has the power to refuse to enforce or comply 
with it. Article I, for its part, does not grant Congress any enumerated power to 
challenge federal laws.232 Instead, Congress has familiar tools to control what it 
views as structural defects—for instance, the House’s withholding of originating 
revenue bills,233 the Senate’s refusing to confirm executive officers,234 and both 
branches’ refusing to enact legislation that the President favors.235 Moreover, 
permitting lawsuits by only affected individuals ensures that the dispute is more 
than merely abstract and any judicial opinion more than advisory. By looking 
outside of Article III when considering institutional standing, it becomes apparent 
that allowing the branches to assert structural challenges would create, at the least, 
significant constitutional questions and upset longstanding historical practice with 
a defensible normative basis. 
Finally, the same concerns that surround institutional incentives for the branches 
to monitor separation-of-powers boundaries236 likely also apply to litigation. Recall 
that partisanship and policy concerns affect how the branches look after their own 
interests in drafting legislation.237 Recall, too, that the branches would be less likely 
to protect their boundaries during times of unified government than during times of 
divided government.238 These same concerns should be expected to affect the 
branches’ decisions to litigate. The incentives for legislating and litigating are the 
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same; it is merely the nature of the action that differs. Accordingly, substantial 
doctrinal and institutional-competence concerns suggest that reliance on the branches 
as litigants is misplaced. 
Disallowing institutional standing does not mean that the branches cannot have a 
role in structural litigation when they are so inclined. As Huq has insightfully noted, 
structural litigation—which impacts the powers and rights of competing branches 
and individuals—is multipolar and thus “inevitably generates . . . spillovers to 
unrepresented parties.”239 Allowing the branches to serve as amici and present their 
views, as the Court has done,240 addresses much of this concern because it allows 
courts to account more easily and thoroughly for the various interests involved. To 
be sure, amici do not control when to sue, factual development, or the framing of 
legal issues.241 But given the Court’s current receptiveness to interlocutory structural 
challenges242 and formalism, it is far from clear that any narrowing of legal issues is 
necessary or that factual development has much effect on the resolution of the 
structural questions. 
III. REGULATED PARTIES’ CHALLENGES SHOULD BE JUSTICIABLE 
Regulated parties have Article III standing to assert structural challenges, despite 
causation and redressability concerns, because these challenges are akin to 
procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its otherwise 
mandatory desiderata. Likewise, regulated parties can also establish causes of action 
because they are within the structural provisions’ zone of interests and because 
history provides no compelling basis for holding otherwise. In short, their challenges, 
contrary to others’ arguments, rest comfortably with existing doctrine. 
A. Article III Standing  
Not only do regulated parties serve as better guardians of structural protections 
than the branches, but the Article III causation and redressability concerns 
surrounding their structural challenges are not meaningful because of their 
procedural complexion. The Court relaxes (or ignores) these two traditional Article 
III standing requirements for procedural challenges to agency action. If it did not do 
so, the mere possibility of a different outcome in continued or later proceedings 
would, under Simon, be insufficient to establish standing.243 Structural challenges 
should be understood as analogous to procedural challenges because both kinds of 
challenges concern values related to how and who within the government acts, not 
substantive outcomes.  
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When understood as analogous to procedural challenges, structural challenges fit 
well within existing standing doctrine (notwithstanding Bond). This is important. 
Huq, in seeking to limit individual structural challenges, readily concedes that his 
proposal is inconsistent with Bond and several other cases.244 But recall that he 
contends that Bond, which permits individual standing, does not fit as comfortably 
with current standing doctrine as his proposal for more muscular institutional 
standing.245 Not only did Part II, supra, identify significant concerns over 
institutional standing, but this Part concludes that Huq is mistaken as to justiciability.  
1. Relaxed Article III Desiderata for Procedural Challenges 
Article III does not require causation and redressability (nor even injury in fact) in 
all cases. In a footnote after outlining the three-part Article III test, the Lujan Court 
deemed procedural rights “special” because one asserting a procedural right need not 
meet all the “normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”246 The Court then 
gave an example in which a challenger who lived next to a proposed federally-licensed 
dam could challenge an agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, 
as required by statute.247 Presumably the challenger’s injury in fact would include the 
aesthetic or economic harm from having to live next to a dam. This challenge would 
be permissible despite, as the Court admitted, a lack of a causal connection between 
the statement’s preparation (the procedure at issue) and whether the dam would be 
built (the substantive decision that creates the injury in fact).248 And, relatedly, a 
judicial order that required the agency to prepare the statement would not necessarily 
redress the challenger’s harm in fact because the dam could be built after the agency 
prepared it. The Court reaffirmed the procedural-challenge exception in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that standing exists “if there is some possibility that 
the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision 
that allegedly harmed the litigant.”249 
Evan Tsen Lee and Josephine Mason Ellis have identified an even more striking 
example under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).250 FOIA allows “any 
person” to obtain nonexempt records if properly requested.251 The requesting party 
can obtain the documents for any reason, including idle curiosity.252 If the request is 
denied, the curious party could sue to obtain the documents.253 The denial would not 
create an injury in fact because hindering one’s curiosity would, under the Court’s 
doctrine, very likely not constitute a sufficiently concrete or otherwise cognizable 
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harm.254 Moreover, the mere violation of one’s legal right to obtain documents is not 
an injury in fact, but a mere (and, since 1970, irrelevant) legal injury. Because there 
need not be any harm, there is no causation between the nonexistent injury-in-fact 
and the complained-of action, and a judicial order requiring the government to grant 
the request does not (and cannot) redress the nonexistent injury in fact.255  
The procedural exception—although rarely expressed as such before Lujan—has 
established provenance in judicial review of administrative agencies. Under a 
well-enshrined principle from SEC v. Chenery, courts can uphold agency action only 
on the grounds upon which the agency relied.256 If the court does not uphold the 
agency action, the court generally must remand to the agency for the agency to 
reconsider its decision.257 The judicial remedy provides the prevailing party a chance 
for the agency to change its decision and thus a chance to cure its injury in fact. But 
the remedy does not guarantee it because “most petitioners have at most a slim 
chance their underlying injury will ever be redressed.”258 Ultimately, had Lujan not 
recognized a procedural exception, Lujan would have “imposed a constitutional 
obstacle to most ordinary administrative law cases.”259 
The procedural-rights exception makes sense because requiring redressability 
misses the point of procedural rights. “[P]rocedural rights have only speculative 
consequences for a litigant.”260 They do not exist, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out, 
to “dictate outcomes but to . . . produce certain regulatory incentives.”261 Unless the 
Article III desiderata are relaxed, judicial review would be absent. The consequence 
is that the regulatory incentives for better decision making, accountability, 
transparency, and fairness, among other values, lose their force. Regulated parties’ 
procedural rights—such as the rights to provide comments on pending rules to the 
agency, to have the agency follow self-enacted rules, to require the agency to disclose 
certain information publicly, or to appear before unbiased fact-finders—would be 
nothing but platitudes whose enforcement depends upon the whim of the 
administering agency.  
Moreover, allowing these procedural challenges to proceed is consistent with 
broader historical practice.262 Public actions, whereby private parties seek to 
vindicate public interests and limitations on government action without establishing 
injury in fact, were features of English and early American law.263 This was so even 
after the enactment of the Federal Constitution, which requires a “case or 
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controversy” under Article III.264 Indeed, “there is no direct evidence that injury in 
fact or concrete interest was intended to be a constitutional prerequisite under Article 
III.”265  
As a final matter, procedural rights can be reasonably defined. Procedural rights, 
as Sunstein argued, do not mandate what government does.266 Instead, the values that 
they seek to further relate to different matters: how government must act to 
implement policy and who within government can act. Within the former category 
are rules that, for example, require agencies to provide notice-and-comment 
opportunities or provide explanations of their decisions.267 Within the latter category 
are rules requiring an administrative law judge to preside over formal hearings268 or 
provisions that identify which agency has jurisdiction over a particular regulated 
party.269 In contrast, provisions that foreclose certain outcomes that affect regulated 
parties’ behavior—like triggers for deportation or those that concern elements for a 
civil violation—are substantive.  
To be sure, these distinctions between substantive and procedural actions, as 
elsewhere in the law, are not without indeterminacy problems. Debates are almost 
certain to occur around the margins in the procedural-exception context, just as they 
do in the Erie choice-of-law context.270 For instance, how should one categorize 
statutory or regulatory rules of evidence? Although they concern how the 
government must prove its case, they are subject to harmless-error review, thereby 
leading courts to consider the likelihood of changed results on remand (and notions 
of causation and redressability, even if not in the standing context).271 Likewise, 
questions of an agency’s jurisdiction over certain subject matter may implicate not 
only who may regulate (for instance, as to which agency has authority to regulate the 
challenging party’s industry) but also what that agency may do (for instance, whether 
the agency can require certain industry disclosures even if other procedures are 
followed). This definitional indeterminacy gives me pause. But I take comfort in the 
fact that, despite more than twenty years passing since Lujan, courts have not 
appeared to face significant difficulty over categorization,272 the solid footing upon 
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which the procedural exception rests in administrative law based on Chenery, and 
the ubiquitous substantive-procedural divide throughout law.  
2. Similarities Between Structural and Procedural Challenges 
Structural rights share key characteristics with procedural ones found in statutes 
or regulations. None seek to mandate a particular outcome for any substantive 
decision. Instead, they seek to further other values. For instance, presentment and 
bicameralism seek to “protect[] residents of small states and minimiz[e] interest 
group influence.”273 The Appointments Clause, as another example, seeks to limit 
despotism (through what the Founders understood as the “insidious” appointments 
to office) and create accountability in appointing officials or branches.274 Judicial 
enforcement of these and other constitutional structural safeguards, like statutory or 
regulatory ones, does not mean that a prevailing party will always obtain relief for 
its injury in fact.275 It merely provides validation of the norm that seeks to further 
underlying values. 
Procedural and structural rights further these values in similar ways. They seek to 
affect either values related to how a decision is reached276 or who can take a certain 
action. For example, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses and the 
Appointments Clause detail how to enact legislation and to appoint officers (and to 
some extent, who can legislate, sign legislation, and appoint). Similarly, the Vesting 
Clauses, the Recess Appointments Clause, and Impeachment Clause identify who 
can exercise judicial, legislative, and executive functions. None of these clauses 
require or prohibit any particular underlying policy decision. The same substantive 
policy that failed to undergo bicameralism and presentment (say, as particularly 
germane in 2015, immigration policies promulgated via questionable executive 
orders277) can gain force as legislation by following constitutional procedural 
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requirements. An individual who was appointed by the wrong process, entity, or 
person can still be appointed by the constitutionally appropriate one. A matter that 
was improperly adjudicated in an Article I court can be adjudicated in an Article III 
court, and the Article III court can reach the same outcome as the Article I court. 
Congress can legislate the same norms that violate the nondelegation doctrine when 
the executive enacts them without sufficient legislative guidance. The President 
could retain or remove an officer that the legislative branch, without proceeding 
through impeachment proceedings, had attempted to retain or remove. In contrast, 
other limitations on government actions, principally those in the Bill of Rights and 
other constitutional amendments, concern what the government can substantively do: 
abridge the right to free speech, constrain the free exercise of religion, limit gun 
ownership, take property without reasonable compensation, or inflict cruel and 
unusual punishment. Although not free from all indeterminacy, the structural concept 
is established and cabined (especially because the structural provisions in the 
Constitution are necessarily limited in number) and thus may be even better defined 
than its “procedural” counterpart.278  
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court’s discussion of harm in the 
context of structural safeguards reveals their similarity to procedural rights. In 
Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s argument that a 
regulated party had to show prejudice from an administrative law judge’s alleged 
unconstitutional appointment.279 In so doing, the court noted that the Supreme Court 
in Ryder left open the question of whether harmless error could apply.280 But it noted 
that the Court had referred to separation-of-powers safeguards (including those 
arising under the Appointments Clause) as “structural.”281 These structural errors 
require automatic reversal without regard to harm.282 The Supreme Court, in fact, 
said that structural safeguards are not “a remedy to be applied only when specific 
harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.”283 Thus, treating structural 
challenges like procedural ones not only makes sense but even fits comfortably 
within separation-of-powers doctrine and rhetoric. 
Finally, the courts’ relaxed (or absent) injury requirement for structural violations 
to federal administrative architecture is consistent with the relaxed injury 
requirement for “structural errors” in the judicial process. For instance, courts do not 
require a showing of causally-related harm for matters that go to the structure of a 
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judicial trial, including the appearance of impartiality of the judge, the denial of a 
criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the exclusion of certain races from the jury, or 
the denial of a public trial.284 In all of these cases, the error concerns how the judiciary 
went about exercising its powers, but it does not assume that the court, when 
complying with structural protections, could not reach the same judgment as before. 
Likewise, structural challenges to the administrative state concern how (and who 
within) the government acts without suggesting that the government cannot, through 
proper means, orchestrate the same outcome. In sum, the Court routinely treats 
claims that concern how government or courts go about exercising their substantive 
powers as different in kind from other challenges.  
To be sure, the Court has sometimes indicated that structural errors require no 
showing of harm because the presumed harm, often in criminal trials, is extremely 
likely.285 Errors concerning government architecture, the argument goes, may not 
warrant the same presumption of harm as in criminal matters and thus should not be 
deemed structural errors for which no harm is required. But the Court’s stated 
likely-harm justification is questionable because presuming harm often presents its 
own problems or is unsound. For instance, successful Batson challenges concerning 
the exclusion of jurors based on their race are not subject to harmless-error review 
and call for an automatic new trial.286 But this remedy is very likely not actually 
based on presumed harm to the defendant.287 If it were, courts would have to presume 
that jurors of different races would reach different verdicts and would have to engage, 
thereby, in the very stereotyping of races (with notions of groupthink) that the Batson 
doctrine seeks to prevent.288 Relatedly, defendants are more likely, as the Court has 
recognized, to cause harm to themselves by demanding to proceed pro se in a 
criminal trial, instead of relying upon counsel.289 Despite the lack of any likely harm 
to the individual in having counsel, the violation of the individual’s Sixth 
Amendment right to represent himself or herself is a structural error for which 
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has been resoundingly rejected by every circuit court that has considered the issue.”). 
 287. Cf., e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (“Defendants in criminal 
proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. 
People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and 
tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.”).  
 288. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 857, 891 (1999). 
 289. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984). 
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automatic reversal is required.290 These examples reveal that grounding a structural 
error on something more than serious, likely individual harm is not novel. 
B. Granting a Cause of Action—Rights and Remedies 
As with Article III standing, regulated parties should have inferred structural 
causes of action because they fit well with existing doctrine. Whether a party should 
have a cause of action is an indeterminate inquiry. The current conception of a cause 
of action looks at the “operative facts” to determine whether “a plaintiff is entitled to 
some remedy,” with less focus than in the past on a particular remedy.291 Because 
the Constitution’s text fails to answer whether regulated parties have a cause of action 
for structural violations,292 any viable cause of action must be inferred. With statutory 
implied private rights of action for damages, the Court has, of late, required clear 
legislative intent to create private rights of action.293 But the Court has been much 
more permissive of allowing causes of actions premised on the Constitution that seek 
only nonmonetary equitable relief.294 This permissive attitude makes sense in the 
context of structural challenges, too. Regulated parties fall within the zone of 
interests of most structural safeguards, suggesting a colorable individual right in 
structural provisions. Although some contend that the historical record undermines 
inferred structural rights, that record is, at best, unclear.  
1. Colorable Rights in Structural Safeguards 
How the Court goes about inferring a private cause of action for equitable relief 
under the Constitution is far from settled. It often handles structural cases under a 
generalized-grievances standing paradigm and advances no further.295 Or the Court 
simply operates with the presumption that equitable relief against the government is 
appropriate.296 When considering the more controversial question of whether an 
implied cause of action for money damages exists, the Court requires that the basis 
for the relief “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damage sustained.”297 But when the Court considers the 
availability of equitable relief under the APA (and, at times, under the 
Constitution298), the Court applies what appears to be a more liberal inquiry: the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 290. See id. 
 291. Bellia, supra note 84, at 798 (emphasis omitted). 
 292. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1449. 
 293. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001). 
 294. See John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2013). 
 295. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (concerning Receipts 
and Expenditures Clause); Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2010) (concerning 
Presidential Eligibility Clause). 
 296. See Preis, supra note 294; Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory 
Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1613–14 (1997). 
 297. OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 432 (1990) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 
U.S. 392, 401–02 (1976)). 
 298. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
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zone-of-interests test. That test requires “the plaintiff [to] establish that the injury he 
complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the ‘zone 
of interests’ sought to be protected by the . . . provision whose violation forms the 
legal basis for his complaint.”299 The Court has recently clarified that the 
zone-of-interests inquiry asks whether a cause of action exists for a “particular 
plaintiff’s claim,”300 although the inquiry may be narrower with provisions, such as 
constitutional ones, that exist outside the APA.301 Because of the Court’s recent 
reliance on the zone-of-interests test in determining whether a statutory cause of 
action exists, because the Court has applied the test to constitutional provisions and 
suits for equitable relief, and because the test is as developed as any other for 
inferring causes of action, I rely on it for the inquiry here.302  
Regulated parties’ challenges easily fall within the structural provisions’ zone of 
interests. Their harm is the cost of being regulated by a government that has not 
followed constitutional protocols before acting. This harm causes loss to property 
(regulatory fines), liberty (ability to act in a certain way or within a certain industry), 
or dignity (having to engage in administrative proceedings by an unconstitutional 
entity). The Founders intended the structural provisions, as even Choper concedes, 
to prevent tyranny and despotism and thereby preserve liberty (and perhaps also 
property).303 In fact, Choper says that this understanding “cannot be seriously 
disputed.”304 And, as previously discussed, the Court has repeatedly and consistently 
noted that the provisions’ purpose is to preserve individual liberty.305 Indeed, in his 
recent concurring opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Justice Scalia (joined by three 
other Justices), noted that structural provisions are “designed first and foremost not 
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 299. Air Courier Conf. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523–24 (1991) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)) (internal 
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399 (1987). Presumably, the same standards govern suits based on constitutional, as opposed 
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 300. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014). 
 301. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16. 
 302. This is not to say that the zone-of-interests-test doctrine is without its own problems. 
See Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the “Zone of the Interests” Standing Test, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 447, 456–59 (describing critics’ views of the test); infra note 307. Nevertheless, the 
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facilitates easier discussion of implied causes of action than other, lesser defined inquiries. In 
other words, I take no position on the propriety of the test as a normative matter; I use it as an 
accepted tool for discussing implied causes of action in the regulatory context.  
 303. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 264–65.  
 304. Id. at 264. 
 305. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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to look after the interests of the respective branches, but to ‘protect[] individual 
liberty.’”306  
Even if the branches are more closely connected than regulated parties to the 
structural provisions’ purposes, regulated parties are still within the zone of interests. 
The Court has noted, albeit in a statutory context, that the subject of a regulatory 
action need not be the only one with a cause of action. Because “[t]he test is not 
meant to be especially demanding,” the provisions need not be intended to benefit 
the plaintiff at issue.307 Instead, the plaintiff need only be “arguably” within the zone 
of interests that the provision at issue intends to protect.308 Under these principles, it 
is beside the point that the branches of government may be the subjects of the 
structural provisions. Instead, it is enough that the regulated parties are within the 
zone of interests that the structural provisions seek to further—preserving individual 
liberty and limiting despotism.  
Relatedly, even if the zone-of-interests test is more demanding in the 
constitutional context,309 it should still cover regulated parties’ claims. The regulated 
parties can point to a specific invasion of their property or liberty interests because 
the agency directly regulates their behavior by, say, ordering the regulated party to 
pay a fine or to stop (or start) certain activities.310 In contrast, structural challenges 
from the populace at large (taxpayers or voters)311 or perhaps the beneficiaries of a 
regulatory regime who seek to challenge an officer or agency’s deviation from 
Congress’s regulatory objective provide concrete examples of plaintiffs whose 
interests (regardless of Article III standing concerns) are too tangentially related from 
the purposes of the underlying structural provisions.312 The relationship between 
their interests (whether liberty, property, or dignity) and structural defects are much 
more attenuated than regulated parties’.  
Analogizing individual enforcement of structural rights to procedural rights helps 
allay prudential concerns over structural causes of action. For instance, the fear that 
expending judicial resources on litigation that may have little impact on the outcome 
seems misplaced because the same concern exists for the much broader category of 
procedural rights. Likewise, structural safeguards’ procedural complexion reveals 
                                                                                                                 
 
 306. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)). 
 307. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987). But see Air Courier Conf. 
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524–25 (1991) (considering whether 
“Congress intended to protect jobs with the Postal Service” when determining if union fell 
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 308. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400. 
 309. See id. at 400 n.16. 
 310. Contra Shane, supra note 30 (“[U]nlike other separation of powers disputes that the 
Court has resolved – in cases such as Youngstown Steel, Chadha, or Boumediene – Noel 
Canning does not relate to individual rights or liberties. . . . Life, liberty and property are 
simply not at issue.”).  
 311. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) 
(stating in the context of an Article III standing inquiry that “[t]he proposition that all 
constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries”).  
 312. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 30, at 506 (describing hypothetical where regulatory 
beneficiaries assert Appointments Clause challenge against EPA Administrator). 
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the shortcomings of the “absolute privilege” objection. Some have argued that 
structural safeguards cannot be individual rights because they do not create an 
“absolute privilege to act in a certain way,” where an “individual (or firm) has a zone 
of privileged action from any federal or state regulation.”313 Instead, structural 
safeguards do not create rights, they argue, because “the exact same act by the exact 
same individual can plainly be regulated by some governmental entity.”314 But this 
argument proves too much because it would also lead courts to stop entertaining 
ordinary procedural challenges. Procedural rights provide no “absolute privilege” 
from governmental action. Instead, the privilege falls away after the government 
complies with procedural requirements, whether statutory or constitutional. Those 
requirements may even apply to one sovereign but not another (for example, a state 
constitution’s due process requirements that exceed the Federal Constitution’s), but 
their limited reach does not prevent individual enforcement.  
In the separation-of-powers context, the fact that one branch of government may 
face procedural or structural limitations before acting, while another does not, says 
nothing about whether individuals can challenge the noncompliance. Structural 
rights permit the government to act against the individual when the entity’s 
composition complies with structural norms. If the entity does not, it has no authority 
to achieve its chosen end, and regulated parties retain their privilege from 
government action. This is so even when the structural norms apply to only certain 
branches. Due process limitations may be the most obvious example. For instance, 
common-law courts and legislatures can establish similar substantive norms although 
legislatures need not comply with due process. The mere fact that one branch must 
comply with constitutional procedural requirements while another branch does not 
has no bearing on whether enforceable rights exist. A private party could seek to 
enforce due process protections if a court acted without doing so. Furthermore, one 
government entity may be required to follow certain procedures before enacting a 
substantive norm, but it may be able to reach the same end by taking another kind of 
action without having to comply with those same procedural requirements. For 
instance, an agency must comply with due process in adjudication that creates a 
substantive norm (like a common-law court’s adjudication), but it likely has little or 
no obligations under the Due Process Clause if it enacts that same norm through 
rulemaking.315 In other words, the limited reach of a procedural or structural 
safeguard to one branch or to certain methods of action does not prevent an individual 
from enforcing that safeguard.316 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. Huq, supra note 20, at 1450 (emphasis omitted). Choper made a similar argument: 
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Finally, challengers’ potential loss in the political realm over the agency’s 
structure or powers should not limit their structural challenges.317 Understanding 
structural rights as similar to procedural rights is key here, too. It may well be that 
challengers lost the substantive battle in the political arena over, say, whether or how 
a particular industry or action should be regulated. But the federal government—just 
like agencies and courts—has to comply with constitutional and statutory procedural 
norms to act. Challenging an agency’s structure may prevent or delay agency action. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that seeking such prevention or delay is somehow 
improper, losing parties can cause the same delay in procedural challenges, too, such 
as those brought under the APA, under the Due Process Clause, or under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Unless one is ready to end procedural challenges generally, 
structural challenges should be able to proceed even if their goal is to stop or slow 
government action. From an even broader perspective, the mere fact that the 
Constitution gives losing factions a weapon against governmental action is neither 
novel nor contrary to current conceptions of judicial review—whether in the 
procedural or substantive context. Allowing the Constitution to serve as a 
countermajoritarian check on legislative action is foundational to judicial review. 
Considering the propriety of regulated parties’ structural cause of action from a 
zone-of-interest and procedural vantage point is another way of vindicating the 
valid-rule doctrine, often encountered in overbreadth or facial challenges. Under this 
well-accepted doctrine, “[E]veryone has a personal constitutional right not to be 
subjected to governmental sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule 
of law.”318 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer concurred in Bond by relying 
on this doctrine.319 The valid-rule doctrine is consistent with judicial allowance for 
procedural challenges and the ability of regulated parties (as contrasted with other 
third parties) to demonstrate why they are sufficiently related to the structural 
provisions to seek their enforcement. What the doctrine fails to explain is how 
structural challenges fulfill Article III standing requirements. The procedural 
exception helps fill this void and bolster the valid-rule doctrine. 
Armed with examples, Huq argues that because the Court fails to apply the 
doctrine consistently to all structural matters, the doctrine cannot explain the Court’s 
structural-standing jurisprudence.320 To be sure, the Court’s haphazard use of the 
political-question doctrine, as discussed in Part I.C.4, reveals consistency problems 
with structural provisions that tend to arise outside of the administrative context. But 
Huq’s examples aren’t as damning as they first appear. For instance, he notes that 
the Court has significantly limited Bicameralism Clause challenges by deferring 
conclusively to congressional leaders’ factual attestation that each congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 317. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1514. 
 318. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2000). 
 319. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
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house passed the bill in question.321 But in the absence of an attested bill and a 
conclusive presumption on a matter of fact, the Bicameralism Clause challenge could 
proceed. Likewise, he notes that the Court has denied taxpayers and citizens standing 
to assert challenges under the Emoluments Clause (which prevents congressional 
members from serving in the executive branch while serving in Congress and from 
being appointed to offices that were created or given a raise during the congress 
member’s elected term322).323 Yet nothing in these cases indicates that a regulated 
party’s challenge would be nonjusticiable. His broader point that the Court’s 
jurisprudence is inconsistent is correct, but it does not mean that the valid-rule 
doctrine is mistaken. Instead, it suggests that the Court should do a better job of 
applying the doctrine to all of the Constitution’s structural provisions, relying on 
factual presumptions,324 and limiting (or at least better distinguishing) political 
questions. Recognizing structural challenges’ analogy to procedural challenges may 
well help courts improve their consistency.  
Similarly, Huq argues that the courts’ remedial practice—with harmless error, 
qualified immunity, and nonretroactivity, for example—undermines the valid-rule 
doctrine. I agree, although I identify different culprits in the structural context, such 
as severance and stays of judgment.325 But these remedial failings do not indict 
regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges. Instead, their identification 
serves as a call for the Court to improve its remedial practice to render regulated 
parties’ causes of action more meaningful. 
2. Neither History nor Practice Are to the Contrary  
The Founders’ intent as to structural causes of action is too indeterminate to serve 
as a meaningful objection to allowing individuals to vindicate structural safeguards. 
I am not aware of any direct evidence of whether the Founders intended regulated 
parties to have structural causes of action. But Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 
78 made the case for significant judicial review, whereby the courts “must . . . declare 
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”326 He repeatedly 
advocated for broad judicial review to reach “every act of a delegated authority, 
contrary to the tenor” of the Constitution.327 Reaffirming the sovereignty of the 
people to limit governmental action through the Constitution, he stated that “[n]o 
                                                                                                                 
 
 321. See id. (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 
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 323. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1453–54 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop 
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)); see also Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam) 
(denying motion for leave to file petition concerning Justice Black’s ineligibility to serve on 
the Supreme Court based on petitioner’s generalized grievance). 
 324. For instance, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, along with certain other states, applies 
only a prima facie presumption (as opposed to a conclusive one) that an enrolled bill is valid 
and permits clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. See D&W Auto 
Supply v. Dep’t of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980). 
 325. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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 327. Id. at 466. 
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legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution[] can be valid.”328 And he stated that 
it is the courts’ role “to keep [the legislature] within the limits assigned to their 
authority.”329 In other writings, Hamilton said that “there ought always . . . be a 
constitutional method of giving efficacy to constructional provisions.”330 Implied 
structural causes of action are consistent with Hamilton’s call for strong judicial 
review. 
To be sure, James Madison failed to mention judicial review in his discussions of 
the mechanisms for ensuring the separation of powers.331 But as Raoul Berger 
concluded after reviewing the constitutional debates and concern over legislative 
aggrandizement, the “[F]ounders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism 
that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds.”332 In fact, Berger pointed to 
statements of James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that “if any 
congressional act should be ‘inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument 
in Congress, the judges . . . will declare such laws to be null and void.’”333 These 
calls for significant judicial review do not suggest exceptions for governmental 
overstepping. 
Huq identifies another of Hamilton’s statements, but it’s inapposite. Huq argues 
that Hamilton “urged that the original Constitution—which, of course, contained the 
separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in terms of vested 
rights” because, in arguing against a Bill of Rights, Hamilton argued that the Bill 
“would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account, 
would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.”334 Yet Hamilton’s 
point was not that individuals had no ability to challenge governmental action that 
exceeded federal power or violated constitutional provisions.335 His point was that 
the Bill of Rights would, contrary to its purpose, undermine individual freedom by 
intimating that the federal government had powers not mentioned in the 
Constitution’s text.336 Hamilton gives no indication that he eschewed individual 
rights in structural provisions. To the contrary, he suggested that rights remain with 
the people to prevent government action that is not constitutionally given because he 
argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary for a constitution “professedly founded 
upon the power of the people.”337 Bradford Clark, reviewing the debates over the Bill 
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of Rights and federalism, concluded that “the Founders understood individual rights 
vis-à-vis the federal government to depend in large measure on the limited nature of 
federal power. Given this understanding, it is anachronistic to distinguish sharply 
between judicial review under the Bill of Rights and judicial review of the scope of 
federal powers.”338 
Like the Founders’ intent, more recent congressional intent does not provide 
grounds for a meaningful objection. Although congressional intent (as well as its 
relevance)339 is far from clear, the APA suggests that structural claims are 
permissible. Most regulated parties’ challenges to agency action fall within the APA 
(even if the parties fail to recognize this).340 The APA requires courts to set aside 
agency action that is, among other things, “contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity.”341 Although the legislative history on the meaning of this 
provision is unhelpful,342 it is notable how broadly the provision is written. It does 
not limit itself to constitutional rights or privileges. It also refers to actions that are 
contrary to constitutional power, a conception that would easily cover actions that 
contravene structural safeguards. After all, government action through an agency is 
contrary to constitutional power if the agency’s architecture violates structural 
principles because those provisions limit how and who within government can act. 
It is doubtful that Congress intended the words to serve as appositives for one 
another. While privileges, immunities, and rights seem to have broadly consistent 
meanings concerning the freedom of an individual from governmental action in 
ordinary parlance, power focuses not on individuals but on the government’s 
authority to act or not.  
Moreover, even if congressional approbation is unclear in the structural context, 
longstanding judicial practice awards equitable relief for violations of federal 
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statutory or constitutional law. So-called nonstatutory review (so named because 
courts have traditionally provided review without pointing to any statutory authority 
for doing so) permits courts—whether or not the APA applies—to provide injunctive 
relief against government officers to prevent unconstitutional action or to invalidate 
entire statutes on constitutional grounds.343 The longstanding practice of granting 
injunctive relief for constitutionally prohibited executive action344 suggests that 
courts should have few qualms in awarding equitable relief in structural litigation. 
And indeed, the ground for liberal equitable relief comes from the fear that 
constitutional limitations on legislative authority (including those concerning how 
the legislature may structure the government) “amount to nothing,” a fear that seems 
even more pronounced in the structural realm.345 To deny an implied private right of 
action for equitable relief for structural matters would be to create an exception to 
standard judicial practice. 
This is not to say, as I have elsewhere, that courts cannot improve remedial 
practice in the structural context. Remedies for structural violations often fail to 
incentivize litigants properly or deter the political branches because they seek to 
create “as little disruption as possible.”346 But these concerns do not mean that the 
courts cannot provide a sufficient remedy. Indeed, sometimes they do, generally by 
requiring legislative or executive action.347 Instead, as I discuss in Part IV.B, infra, 
it suggests that courts should be more cognizant of effective remedies and ultimately, 
from a realist’s perspective, less willing to find violations in the first instance. 
Curable remedial insufficiencies should not overcome otherwise strong arguments 
for judicial review. 
By examining the fit between regulated parties’ standing for structural actions and 
other standing doctrine, and the relative ease of inferring a cause of action under 
traditional doctrine, one can see that regulated parties’ structural challenges are not 
aberrations of justiciability doctrine. Moreover, the procedural exception for causation 
and redressability requirements makes normative sense because it is the process, as 
opposed to the substantive outcome, that procedural rules seek to regulate. The 
doctrinal and institutional limitations on branch standing further complicate the ability 
of the branches to serve as defenders for structural norms, and these limitations 
provide additional normative support for permitting claims by regulated parties in the 
structural context. Calls to abandon the individual action and permit mere branch 
                                                                                                                 
 
 343. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1623; id. at 1668–69 (noting that nonstatutory review 
is so common, courts don’t “even think[] about it”); id. at 1669–70. For actions under the 
APA, the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to codify so-called nonstatutory 
review “where Congress has made no contrary provision for judicial review.” See 92 CONG. 
REC. 5654 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Walter). 
 344. See Preis, supra note 294, at 34–38 (discussing Court’s equitable remedies in 
constitutional cases). 
 345. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1630 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 346. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336–37 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013). 
 347. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 527–36 (discussing more successful remedies in Ryder 
and Northern Pipeline). 
710 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:665 
 
enforcement—whatever their doctrinal and normative bases—must grapple not only 
with doctrinal disruption but also with the normative basis for this doctrine.  
IV. ADDRESSING UNDERLYING CONCERNS 
To say that individuals should have a cause of action for structural challenges is 
not to say that structural challenges should remain as they are. Legitimate concerns 
continue to bedevil structural challenges, including the overall utility of structural 
litigation (in light of causal and redressability questions),348 challengers’ 
opportunism in seeking legal redress after losing political fights,349 the failure of the 
courts to consider factors that lead to structural innovation and thus not allow the 
political branches discretion in creating the administrative state (absent relatively 
clear constitutional prohibitions),350 and the limited effectiveness of judicial 
remedies for prevailing parties.351 Courts can address many of the problems that 
create discomfort with an individual cause of action in less dramatic ways than 
denying individuals the right to sue. 
The underlying cause of much of these concerns is too much judicial involvement 
in structural challenges. For instance, by setting strict branch boundaries, courts 
decide matters concerning relatively immaterial structural innovations (such as the 
tiered protections from removal in Free Enterprise Fund) and thereby exacerbate 
concerns over the utility of structural litigation. Relatedly, judicial decisions that 
sharply delineate the branches’ boundaries deny the political branches discretion to 
adjust them in the face of new challenges. As the courts reach more issues and 
encourage more litigation, they attempt to limit the effect of their rulings by 
providing less meaningful remedies.352 Limiting, but not ending, judicial review 
mitigates these concerns. 
Courts can limit their review by turning, where appropriate, to functionalism for 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The Court can get there in two ways. First, it 
can directly alter the underlying doctrine. Second, if the Court is hesitant to alter its 
doctrine directly, it can reach the same ends indirectly by providing more significant 
remedies. In doing so, as I explain below, courts will very likely begin to defer to the 
political branches without abandoning judicial review altogether.  
But, before considering how to alter the underlying substantive law, let me 
address a potential objection: Why shouldn’t the Court instead alter its justiciability 
doctrine to permit only the most significant challenges and thereby give the branches 
more structural discretion? The key reason is that the focus of the justiciability 
doctrines is not the quantum of harm or the potential benefits from innovation. 
Instead, it focuses on the mere existence of harm (if required). Relatedly, 
justiciability doctrines are intended to be trans-substantive because they apply 
                                                                                                                 
 
 348. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 349. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1502–14. 
 350. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 298–305; Huq, supra note 28, passim. 
 351. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 352. See infra notes 379–380 and accompanying text. 
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generally to all lawsuits or, at the very least, challenges of a particular kind.353 But 
some structural protections, as discussed below, permit more discretion (the 
President’s removal power, for instance) than others (say, those under the 
Appointments Clause). The underlying doctrine, which is provision-based and not 
trans-substantive, can better address how much or little discretion exists for the 
political branches as to each structural protection. Moreover, creating more doctrinal 
disruption in an already confused area of the law354 is especially troubling in the 
structural context because regulated parties’ structural challenges, as discussed 
above, fit reasonably well within existing justiciability doctrines and respond to 
theoretical concerns over lackluster institutional incentives. For these reasons, the 
substantive doctrine itself can better accommodate concerns over structural 
challenges. 
A. Proper Place for Functionalism and Political Discretion 
Formalism is ill-suited for interpreting indeterminate text. This is the case with 
the vesting clauses for each branch because they fail to describe where the branches’ 
boundaries should be. Indeed, it is very difficult to argue that prophylactic boundaries 
are appropriate355 after courts have recognized that the boundaries must, by necessity, 
be somewhat porous.356 To use the President in an example, the President in 
executing the law must create generalized standards to fill statutory gaps (for 
instance, when are veterans as a class sufficiently “incapacitated” to trigger 
entitlement to benefits?) and adjudicate specific issues (for instance, is a particular 
veteran entitled to benefits?). Moreover, as Manning has explained, formalists must 
often rely upon a separation-of-powers background norm despite the Founders’ lack 
of any agreed-upon baseline norm357 and ignore Congress’s powers under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.358 And there is the concern that certain symbols of a 
branch’s power assume disproportionate importance. The removal power, for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 353. See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 691–93 
(2013); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable 
Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 148–51 (1998). 
 354. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002) (referring 
to standing doctrine as a “jumbled mess”). 
 355. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (stating that separation of 
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conflict”). 
 356. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he Framers did not 
require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate 
and distinct.”); id. at 381 (“Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon 
the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as 
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governing itself effectively.’”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per 
curiam)). 
 357. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1993–2005. 
 358. See id. at 1986–93. 
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instance, has come to symbolize the President’s executive power despite 
longstanding questions surrounding its utility.359  
Formalism still has a limited role. For instance, it makes sense to apply formalism 
to the fairly detailed text of the Appointments Clause and the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clause.360 But its reach should be much more limited than under the 
Court’s current jurisprudence for the reasons discussed above.  
The Court’s overreliance on formalism has caused much of the concern over 
structural actions. By serving as a prophylaxis for demarcating boundaries and 
proudly recognizing one concern to the detriment of other values,361 formalism 
provides more victories to challengers than functionalism would and thereby 
encourages structural litigation over relatively minor structural innovations. Because 
the impact of the innovation on the branches or individuals is irrelevant, formalism 
encourages litigation whose utility is, at the very least, questionable because the 
ruling may do little to protect while invalidating useful structural innovations.362 
Relying upon functionalism helps mitigate these concerns because the Court, by 
deeming fewer structures unconstitutional, will discourage litigation over minor 
structural innovations. Indeed, functionalism has limited nondelegation363 and 
Article III challenges.364 Moreover, as structural challenges are generally less 
successful, regulated parties will necessarily take their administrative-structure 
concerns to the political branches.365 
By giving the branches more breathing space, functionalism allows the branches 
to set their own boundaries. Huq’s call for allowing the branches to bargain over 
structural boundaries (in both a federalism and separation-of-powers context) 
comports with original meaning. He notes that nothing in the text prohibits 
bargaining, and, indeed, it is consistent with the First Congress’s rejection of 
Madison’s proposal to treat the branches’ powers as exclusive (and thereby prevent 
structural innovation).366 Moreover, looking at acquiesced-in actions, as the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 359. See Barkow, supra note 198 (considering other methods of creating agency 
independence and noting limited effect of removal power). 
 360. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1943–44, 1958. 
 361. See Huq, supra note 27, at 16 (“[T]he Free Enterprise Fund majority opinion is 
drafted as if the only constitutional good to be pursued in administrative agency design is 
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litigation). 
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 365. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1508 (discussing regulated parties’ litigating 
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to pursue deregulatory goals). 
 366. See Huq, supra note at 28, at 1649. 
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recently did in Noel Canning, can reveal the branches’ accumulated wisdom.367 After 
all, from a perspective of institutional competence, the political branches have access 
to factors that “courts systematically lack,” such as political costs, responses from 
other political actors, relevant norms within bureaucratic institutions, and the 
efficacy of other constitutional or political instruments to control agency costs.368  
Of course, there are limits to this discretion and bargaining.369 Providing a 
governing rule under a functionalist approach is probably impossible (and therein 
lies the allure of rigid formalism), but one could do worse than the standard that the 
Court in Morrison v. Olson applied—asking whether a structural innovation impeded 
the central functions of the branch at issue.370 Morrison, however, can be criticized 
for misapplying its standard in that case (because the President’s control over 
prosecutors is central to the effective functioning of the executive branch, as the 
Clinton-Lewinsky investigation later suggested)371 and for not giving the standard 
more definition by identifying prohibited structures. Despite Morrison’s failing, 
certain structural “innovations” would likely command widespread condemnation. 
For instance, the political branches should not be permitted to limit the President’s 
power to remove key Cabinet members—such as the Secretary of State or Secretary 
of Defense—whose positions go to the heart of traditional and constitutionally 
specified executive powers over foreign affairs and national defense.372 Likewise, 
permitting only Article I courts to decide constitutional questions would likely 
violate Article III because it strikes at the heart of Article III courts’ power of judicial 
review and the rationale for creating a judiciary independent of the political branches. 
Outside of these and similarly significant structural innovations, the branches 
deserve discretion. By granting the branches room while retaining judicial review for 
especially troubling cases, courts can provide the discretion that the political question 
doctrine permits without allowing the constitutional safeguards to become merely 
aspirational.373  
                                                                                                                 
 
 367. See id. at 1625; see also passim NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) 
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B. The Utility of Maximal Remedies 
Because of the Court’s general trend in favor of formalism,374 it may be hesitant 
to return to functionalism. But there is a way of getting there more gradually and 
indirectly—by providing more significant remedies. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
courts’ minimalistic remedies for prevailing parties in structural litigation undermine 
structural safeguards. Recall that this minimalism takes shape by using severance, de 
facto doctrines, and stays of judgment.375 I have suggested that courts provide more 
meaningful remedies, such as requiring the political branches—without stays of 
judgment or de facto doctrines as countervailing forces—to enact curative 
legislation for the agency to continue acting.376 By doing so, they provide, for 
instance, a better chance for the challenging party to get something beneficial from 
the successful challenge (an incapacitated agency) and a meaningful rebuke to the 
political branches to deter future structural violations.377 But I asked—but did not 
resolve—whether such remedies may unfairly affect those who rely upon the agency 
to go about their businesses and favor parties who advance a deregulatory agenda.378  
After more reflection, I conclude that maximalist remedies are likely to prove 
useful, even if accompanied by some unfair consequences, because they will be rare. 
My reasoning, although perhaps paradoxical, is simple: as judicial remedies expand, 
the underlying rights shrink.379 This phenomenon exists because courts do not seek to 
expend judicial capital on defending judgments with significant resistance, either 
because of political backlash or pragmatic problems for third parties.380 Empirical 
evidence of this phenomenon is limited, as Daryl Levinson has noted, by our inability 
to know whether judges would act differently with different remedial regimes in place, 
but we can evaluate how judges have responded over time to maximal remedies.381 
The inverse relationship between remedies and rights is perhaps most evident in 
Fourth Amendment litigation, where the powerful exclusionary rule came to limit the 
reach of the underlying right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures.382 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has limited the notion of a “liberty interest” in the face 
of significant monetary remedies for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.383 
                                                                                                                 
 
 374. See supra Part I.B. 
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One may observe this inverse relationship, too, from a partly controlled experiment 
concerning whether trial and appellate courts find the same number of Batson 
violations, that is, challenges to the exclusion of a juror based on that juror’s race. 
Faced with a Batson violation, trial judges can simply include the wrongly excluded 
juror, while appellate courts must order a new trial for this structural defect.384 Pamela 
Karlan found that appellate courts—which must issue a more severe remedy than trial 
courts—hesitate more than trial courts in finding a Batson violation.385 In the 
separation-of-powers context, maximal remedies should likewise be rare.  
Congress, for its part, should express its desire for maximal judicial remedies to 
obtain more discretion. The Court’s current presumption is that Congress prefers the 
severance of structural defects instead of the invalidation of the agency’s organic act 
or substantive power.386 In Free Enterprise Fund, for instance, the Court severed a 
removal provision after saying that it generally sought to sever structural defects 
when the remainder of the act could function independently and when Congress did 
not make it “evident” through statutory text or historical context that it would prefer 
a maximalist remedy.387 To have courts apply maximalist remedies in the future, 
Congress needs to overcome this presumption by clarifying in newly enacted 
legislation that it intends courts not to sever structural violations. Although the 
political branches fear administrative disruption, the disruption, as discussed above, 
should be rare and ultimately give the branches more discretion in structural matters. 
Turning to maximalist remedies does no violence to the Court’s general remedial 
practice. First, the Court’s presumption concerning severance remains, but the 
presumption is overcome (perhaps categorically over time) if Congress makes its 
preference for maximalist remedies for structural defects clear. The Court need not 
alter its baseline for all constitutional remedies. Second, it makes sense to seek 
maximalist remedies here, as opposed to other constitutional rights, to give the 
prevailing parties a meaningful benefit. As I have argued elsewhere, structural 
remedies are less effective than remedies for most other constitutional rights. With 
the enforcement of substantive rights, the prevailing party gets something—the 
ability to act in a certain way and the ability to avoid government sanction.388 This 
benefit is not always certain with procedural rights; the right to procedure does not 
guarantee a favorable outcome. But typical administrative procedures—such as the 
right to comment on agency action, limits on ex parte communications, or 
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requirements for impact studies—often affect substantive decisions.389 Structural 
safeguards, however, seem even less likely than run-of-the-mill procedural rights to 
affect agency action. Because the prevailing party is less likely to obtain any benefit 
from the challenge, the remedy must be more significant than in other constitutional 
litigation to incentivize litigation and deter structural defects. A maximalist remedy 
that hinders regulation likely qualifies. Nevertheless, in a balanced fashion, a more 
functionalist doctrine that finds few structural defects will limit the number of 
challenges to the most meaningful.  
One of the benefits of turning to remedies for structural challenges is that it causes 
little disruption to existing doctrine. Courts have given scant attention to these 
remedies. They are undertheorized, barely discussed, and often provided without the 
parties’ request.390 Because of the relationship between remedies and rights, by 
turning to remedies and providing significant ones, courts can adjust the doctrine 
gradually. Nor is there anything improper about doing so as long as the Court is 
candid about what it is doing. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court should not 
pretend that structural safeguards are more important than their remedies indicate.391 
Maximal remedies would be congruent with the importance that the Court has 
ascribed to structural safeguards, while recognizing, even if only over a series of 
decisions, that those safeguards should refer to core protections or those that have a 
strong textual basis in the Constitution. 
Finally, the disruption that maximal remedies cause will be limited and 
appropriate. Because the rights will constrict as the remedies become stronger, the 
use of the remedies will be rare and thereby limit the instances of disruption. But 
when the remedies apply, the disruption that they cause will be appropriate because 
the structural defect will go to the core of the structural safeguard or violate a specific 
constitutional requirement. An agency, for instance, whose principal officers are all 
improperly appointed (as in Buckley v. Valeo) should not function. The disruption is 
appropriate because Congress has ignored straightforward constitutional 
requirements. The Court should seek to deter Congress and require it to absorb 
political fallout from the structural defect. And the Court should give the challenging 
party something that it seeks—a deregulatory remedy—to incentivize the regulated 
party’s suit. In this way, the putative vice of maximal remedies becomes their virtue. 
And, at any rate, the political branches aren’t helpless. They can seek to mitigate the 
disruption by taking curative action, such as by providing, as the political branches 
did in Noel Canning, unquestionably constitutional appointments before judicial 
decision.392  
C. Achieving Optimal Enforcement 
Validating, yet limiting, individual structural actions with more functional 
jurisprudence and maximalist remedies provides optimal enforcement of 
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constitutional structural norms. The optimal amount of enforcement is not static 
throughout the Constitution. Instead, as discussed supra in Part IV.A, Manning has 
persuasively demonstrated that formalism should apply to well-defined structural 
provisions and functionalism should apply to open-ended provisions. The formalist 
provisions benefit the most from rigorous individual enforcement, while the 
functional provisions need only occasional defense and should properly remain 
largely within the discretion of the political branches to define.  
First, regulated parties’ ability to enforce provides a meaningful check on 
governmental action when the political branches have failed to heed defined 
structural limitations. The political branches’ failure is most evident with the more 
formalist provisions, such as the Appointments Clause violations in Buckley v. Valeo, 
where both the President and the Senate permitted the dilution of their appointment 
and consent powers,393 or such as the bicameralism and presentment violations in 
INS v. Chadha, where both the President and the Congress, once again, permitted 
dilution of their powers to agree to legislative action.394 Regulated parties in both 
instances validated the clear, detailed structural provisions. Permitting regulated 
parties’ actions does not impede the political branches from enforcing structural 
protections; the regulated parties merely serve as a second line of defense when the 
branches fail to do so.  
Second, the regulated parties can protect the functional structural provisions from 
the political branches’ abuses of discretion. The political branches properly have 
significant discretion in defining the boundaries between the branches through the 
Vesting Clauses because the Founders did not prove strict boundaries or even agree 
on what underlying principles should guide the separation of powers generally.395 
Moreover, the necessary overlap of legislative, executive, and judicial functions 
reveals the impossibility of setting crisp boundaries between the branches, and this 
indeterminacy permits the political branches to account for the various values and 
goals that they hope to balance or achieve with components of the administrative 
state.396 But such discretion can be abused, as I suggested it was with the overly 
independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson.397 It is in these rare cases that the 
regulated parties’ ability to sue and obtain a meaningful remedy adds value and 
permits optimal enforcement.  
Let me conclude with a final, possible objection. Do these benefits of litigation 
matter if the Founders’ connection between liberty and separated powers was 
mistaken either originally or in the modern administrative state?398 In other words, 
should we waste judicial energy in enforcing structural provisions whose utility is 
questionable?  
Even assuming that the Founders overstated the connection between liberty and 
separated powers, that mistake should be corrected by constitutional revision, not 
judicial dereliction. The formalist provisions have not meaningfully prevented 
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government action (because, after curing the structural defect, the government almost 
always pursues the same substantive policy) and thus require no judicial self-help to 
keep the federal government functioning. Moreover, such self-help is especially 
troubling in the structural context because the judiciary, by refusing to enforce 
relatively detailed provisions whose purpose is well understood and instead 
championing its own notions of good constitutional policy, would usurp 
constitutional (and macrolegislative) prerogative. The danger of the courts ignoring 
structural prohibitions becomes even more apparent when one considers the 
normative case for the judiciary ignoring court-related procedural requirements 
merely because the court doesn’t think that the constitutional framers or legislature 
made the correct policy decision in the first instance.  
CONCLUSION 
As this Article’s title suggests, my goal here is to further two independent 
conversations and reveal how they relate to one another. First, regulated parties 
should have standing for separation-of-powers challenges. That is, they should have 
a justiciable cause of action based on separation-of-powers protections because these 
actions, contrary to recent scholarship, rest well within current doctrine and 
normative goals of judicial review. Second, scholars and jurists should stand up to 
the Court’s currently overly formalistic separation-of-powers jurisprudence. A more 
functionalist jurisprudence will better address lingering litigation-utility concerns 
than fiddling with justiciability. Regulated parties’ challenges, when properly 
limited, provide the best mechanism for providing enforcement of constitutional 
structural safeguards while still allowing the political branches to structure an 
effective administrative state. 
